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ABSTRACT
Managing Merger Risk During the Post-Selection Phase
BY
Robert William Heller
April 8, 2013
Committee Chair:

Dr. Pam Scholder Ellen

Major Academic Unit: Robinson College of Business

Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are an important part of many companies’ strategic
plans, yet they often fail to meet expectations. Part of this failure may be due to a lack of
understanding of the risks present during the important period after the initial agreement to
merge has been struck and the failure to apply a practical framework for managing these risks.
The literature outlines many of the risks managers face and explains risk resolution techniques
that can be used to mitigate these risks. Risk management techniques or frameworks have been
developed for use in projects involving mergers and acquisitions (M&A), construction, strategic
alliances, software requirements development, distributed software projects, and post-merger
implementation of information systems. However, to our knowledge, no integrated framework
has been developed to manage risks during the post-selection phase of mergers and acquisitions.
In this dissertation we identify risks present and the risk resolutions available at this stage
of the M&A process via a review of the literature and interviews with experienced managers of
ix

mergers and acquisitions. We then develop a practical framework for managing post-selection
phase risks in M&A. We analyzed published case studies to evaluate the framework and confirm
issues raised in the literature review. Hence, this research contributes to the M&A and risk
management literature by identifying and classifying the risks in the post-selection phase of the
M&A process, identifying and developing a classification of risk resolution actions linked to
those risks, and providing a practical framework that can be used to more comprehensively
identify risks and potential risk management strategies.

x

INTRODUCTION

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are important to many companies implementing
growth strategies and other company transformations. Other companies who may not wish to
pursue M&As as part of their corporate strategy may be subject to unwanted acquisition
proposals, competitors’ acquisitions of other key industry players, or pressure from public
shareholders to participate in the M&A market as either an acquirer or target.

Even large

companies are not isolated from the possibility of a buyout, as evidenced by the $46 billion
buyout of TXU Corporation in 2007, the $32 billion buyout of HCA in 2006, and six other
buyouts from 2006 to 2008 of companies with a market cap of more than $20 billion (Jenkinson
and Stucke, 2011). For smaller and privately-held companies, being acquired may provide the
most effective exit strategy for their owners to obtain liquidity.
Despite the prevalence and importance of M&As, they do not work out particularly well,
at least for the acquiring company. Researchers have found that acquirer results are usually not
considered good either by their management (Bruner, 2002) or by researchers (King, Dalton,
Daily et al., 2004). Overall, from a financial point of view, acquirers would often be better off
foregoing the mergers they instigate. The acquired company does better, since its stock price is
likely to go up after the merger is announced to reflect the premium paid by the acquirer (Bruner,
2002).
Researchers have sought to determine why M&A performance is so poor. Antecedents to
mergers have been examined to determine what characteristics of mergers might be moderators
of performance. These conditions include deal characteristics such as payment type, deal type
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997) and relatedness, managerial effects such as ownership and
1
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managerial experience (Pablo, 1994), firm characteristics such as firm size and acquirer
experience, and environmental factors such as waves and regulations (Haleblian, Devers,
McNamara et al., 2009). Generally the antecedents are not good moderators of acquisition
performance (King, Dalton, Daily et al., 2004).
In addition, management may not have control over the antecedents even if they could be
found to be helpful. For example, recognizing that it may be helpful to make acquisitions at the
beginning of a merger wave is only helpful if management can recognize the beginning of a
wave and is in a position to undertake an acquisition at that time.
Jemison and Sitkin (1986) examined the acquisition process to explain M&A
performance. Their work supplemented the focus on strategic and organizational fit previously
used to explain acquisition outcomes. They identified four process perspective issues that can
negatively affect M&A performance: activity segmentation, escalating momentum, expectational
ambiguity and management system misapplication. Others have identified many additional
process-related issues that can impede the success of a merger. In this dissertation, we focus on
the issues that arise during the post-selection phase, that is, after a merger has been agreed to by
both parties.
The post-selection phase of the M&A process is an important one for the success of a
merger. The success of the integration and resource management of the companies is often
determined by management actions during this period (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). The literature
provides strong endorsement of the need for thorough due diligence (Angwin, 2001) and
planning for the post-merger integration of the firms during the post-selection stage (Epstein,
2004). Haleblian, Devers, McNamara et al. (2009) highlighted the need for more understanding
of “the implementation of acquisitions, especially about how firms integrate, transfer, and
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manage the resources of the combined firm, which underscores the need for greater focus on
acquisition implementation in general” (p. 490).
Some M&A failures have been attributed to the lack of risk management during the postselection phase of the M&A process (Epstein, 2004). Specific risks to M&A success identified
in the literature include corporate culture (Appelbaum, Gandell, Yortis et al., 2000) and delays in
implementing post-merger integration (Epstein, 2004). Harris (2007) sought to systematically
determine the most important M&A risks for a particular company based on the experiences of
their management team, but did not provide risk resolutions or a framework for managing risk.
Researchers want to understand the risks and develop a risk management process for
large, complicated corporate endeavors such as IT projects, construction projects and segments
of the M&A process. A variety of methods have been used to guide managers in understanding
and managing the risks in these types of projects. These methods range from relatively simple
check lists that remind managers of possible risks to more involved risk management
frameworks that help identify, prioritize and resolve risks.
However, the literature does not provide a comprehensive list of risks and resolutions for
the post-selection stage of the M&A process, nor does it classify risks and resolutions in a
manner conducive for use by practitioners. Finally, the literature fails to provide a risk
management framework for use in managing risks in the post-selection stage of M&A.
In our research, we first developed a list of the risks that may arise during the M&A
process and methods to resolve these risks based on a review of the literature. We then
synthesized them into risk areas and interviewed M&A practitioners to verify the risks and risk
resolutions. We applied the resulting risk management framework to published case studies to

4

determine its usefulness in the M&A process. The result is the first risk management
framework for the post-selection phase of the M&A process.
This framework provides an approach for practitioners and researchers to use in
evaluating the risks present in an M&A process. Using this approach, practitioners may be able
to better assess the riskiness of a merger, identify appropriate risk resolution strategies, and
improve future merger evaluations by documenting this how the framework could enhance or be
adapted to their process . Researchers may be able to use the framework to help explain M&A
process issues and outcomes, and to assist practitioners in applying the current knowledge about
the moderators of M&A performance to the M&A process.

LITERATURE REVIEW: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important part of the strategy many corporate
managers use to grow their companies and increase company value. In 2011, forty thousand
mergers worth over $2.5 trillion were completed worldwide (Reuters, 2012). While the quantity
of mergers fluctuates cyclically as economic and market conditions change, the 2011 M&A
activity represents an increase in the total value of M&A transactions from $829 billion worth of
mergers in 1995.
This trend illustrates the importance of M&A as a component of the corporate strategy
toolkit. Boosting corporate growth rates or pursuing corporate strategies via M&A is
contemplated by many companies and implemented by a large number. For example, in looking
at the diversification programs of thirty-three companies over a thirty-six year period, (Porter,
1987) found that more than 70% of the companies’ attempts to diversify were done via
acquisitions as opposed to start-ups or joint ventures. Another strategic use of M&A is with
corporate divestitures to rid oneself of underperforming units or focus resources.
Even corporate managers not interested in M&A as part of their growth strategy may
have to be prepared to be involved in a merger. Publicly-traded companies may become the
target of an unsolicited merger offer, and for private companies the sale of a company maybe the
most viable means of obtaining liquidity for the shareholders.
The terms merger, acquisition, and M&A are used interchangeably in this dissertation to
describe transactions where a change of control in ownership occurs. This type of transaction is
distinct from strategic alliances, joint ventures and partnerships that do not usually entail a
change of control and often require little integration of existing company operations.

5
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II.I Frequent Failures
Given the importance of M&A in corporate strategy, as well as many spectacular
examples of M&A failures, researchers have attempted to determine if executing M&As is a
successful strategy. One of the spectacular failures documented in the literature is Quaker Oats
purchase of Snapple for $1.7 billion in 1994, which Quaker Oats sold for $300 million in 1997
(Hitt, Harrison and Ireland, 2001). The loss of up to $6 billion by AT&T in the purchase of NCR
is another well-documented example of merger failure (Lys and Vincent, 1995). In addition to
the large, well-documented failures, the literature shows that on average acquirers fail to achieve
above average returns from their mergers. In summary, when the acquirer and target are
considered together, slight gains are noted in the short term (around the time of the merger
announcement) but they suffer negative returns in the longer term (Bruner, 2002). Merger
studies differ in the measures used to evaluate success (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). The
primary measures include abnormal returns, accounting studies, and managers’ evaluations of
merger success (Bruner, 2002). The literature conducted using these three measures shows that
M&As in general do not work out well: that is, researchers have not found positive long term
benefits from M&As.
II.I.i Abnormal returns literature. The most prevalent measure of merger success is the
abnormal returns metric, measured as compound abnormal returns (“CAR”) (Martynova and
Renneboog, 2008). An abnormal return is the difference between the realized returns from a
company’s stock compared to a benchmark return that presumably would have been realized if
no merger had taken place. Its use for measuring short-term share price changes is based on the
assumption that markets are efficient, that is, upon announcement of the proposed merger, the
share prices of the acquirer and target will reflect all information available about the gains to be
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realized in the future from the combination of the two companies. One reason the CAR measure
is frequently used is because large samples of publicly available data can be obtained (Toschi,
Bolognesi, Angeli et al., 2007).
The long-term shareholder wealth effects from M&As have also been explored using
compound abnormal returns. Studies based on eighteen to sixty months of stock performance
help answer the concern that evaluating merger results in the short term reflects only what the
market indicates will be the results of the merger, but does not tell us if the merger achieved
strategic goals. However, when used for longer-term studies, this approach has several
shortcomings. One, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the merger from other effects on a
company’s stock price when evaluating stock price performance over a long time period.
Second, some of the calculations of benchmark performance suffer from statistical issues or
shortcomings, such as the use of imperfectly matched firms for comparison with the merged
company (Bessembinder and Zhang, 2012). Lamenting the lack of a viable benchmark against
which to test, one researcher commented that “The fact that financial economists look at these
articles as scientific fact is beyond belief. There is simply no way to assess the long-term
implications of an acquisition given the data that is available” (Shojai, 2009, p. 9). Third,
theories of stock market efficiency predict that any future gains to be derived from the
combination of the two firms will be reflected immediately in their stock prices upon the merger
announcement. If that is the case, one should not expect any abnormal returns over the long term
since they would all be incorporated in the short term.
Meta-analyses of M&As show that, in the short term, stock prices of the targets in M&A
deals show positive CARs (see Table 1 below). Evidence for acquirer CARs is less conclusive,
possibly reflecting concerns that the acquirer has overpaid or that any expected gains from the
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combination have been realized by the increase in the target’s stock price. The combined
companies achieve positive short term CARs, which is generally attributed to an efficient market
evaluating the prospects of the combined company favorably.
Studies of CARs indicate that, in the long term, merged companies fail to outperform
their benchmarks. These studies with a long-term focus usually analyze the period six months
after the merger announcement to several years later. Table 1 summarizes the results of five
meta-analyses that evaluated 290 studies of the performance of over 200,000 M&As. The plus
and minus signs indicate the authors concluded that the studies they evaluated indicated positive
or negative CARs. The zeros indicate that the results were not definitive.
Table 1 – Summary of M&A Meta-Analyses
Focus of Study

Time Period
Announcement Date

Long Term

Acquirer Returns

+K,0T,0M,0B

NA

Target Returns

+K,+B,+M,+T

NA

Merged Company Returns

+M,+B,+T

-M,-K,-B,-A

T= (Toschi, Bolognesi, Angeli et al., 2007)
M= (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008)
B = (Bruner, 2002)

K= (King, Dalton, Daily et al., 2004)
A= (Agrawal and Jaffe, 1999)

II.I.ii Accounting studies. In the accounting studies approach the financial operating
performance of the combined companies is used to evaluate M&A performance over the long
term. These financial metrics include such measures as return on equity, return on assets, sales
growth, net income, and profit margins. This method captures the financial performance of the
combined firm after the merger is complete and compares it to the financial performance of
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similar companies or industry performance. A meta-analysis by Martynova and Renneboog
(2008) reviewed 26 studies and found that 14 (59%) showed a post-merger decline in operating
returns, and only five “provide evidence of a significantly positive increase” (p. 2168). After
finding that 21 of 26 studies, covering over 6,500 acquisitions, showed a decline or no significant
changes in operating returns, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) concluded that there is little
evidence that merged companies experience long-term improvements in operating performance.
The accounting studies methodology is limited in that operating metrics do not adjust for other
issues affecting company performance (Lubatkin, 1983). In addition, a merger may be
successful in achieving strategic goals that are not reflected in a company’s financial statements.
II.I.iii Management evaluations. Another measure of merger performance is
management evaluations of the success of mergers, obtained either through surveys of managers
or in the course of a case study. Bruner (2002) reviewed ten studies that used managers’
evaluations of the success of mergers. Combining the results from those ten studies, we found an
average of 63% of the deals evaluated were not deemed by company managers to have
performed at an above-average level. For one of those articles, the authors interviewed the
managers of companies involved in 53 mergers in high-tech industries and found that only nine
(17%) of the 53 were considered successful. The others were considered failures or their returns
on investment were disappointing (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999). These surveys of practitioners
provide insight into how those who are involved with mergers evaluate their success. The case
study method may also give us richer detail as to the reasons for a merger failure than other
methods. However, both may be limited in their generizability (Bruner, 2002).
II.I.iv Conclusion. It appears that acquisitions on average fail to provide much benefit to
the acquirer. Only the acquired companies appear to obtain a benefit from the premium paid for
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its stock in the merger versus the pre-announcement stock price. The state of M&A performance
can be summarized as follows: “Quite simply, we find no evidence that acquisitions, on average,
improve the financial performance (e.g. abnormal returns or accounting performance) of
acquiring firms after the day completed acquisitions are announced” (King, Dalton, Daily et al.,
2004 p. 195).
II.II Explaining Failures
Given that large numbers of M&A do not appear to be helping companies, researchers
have attempted to identify when value is gained in mergers. They have investigated moderators
of acquisition performance such as how a deal is sourced, whether the form of payment is in cash
or stock, and the strategic fit of the two companies (Weber, Tarba and Bachar, 2011). The
potential moderators have been categorized in a framework set forth by Haleblian, Devers,
McNamara et al., (2009) as:
1) deal characteristics such as payment type and deal type (Agrawal, Jaffe and
Mandelker, 1992);
2) managerial effects such as managerial ownership and target management experience
(Pablo, 1994);
3) environmental factors such as waves and regulations (Martynova and Renneboog,
2008); and
4) firm characteristics such as acquirer experience (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999) and
relatedness of the merging companies.
Table 2 provides a summary of some of the conclusions reached by researchers who have
used the moderators mentioned by Haleblian, Devers, McNamara et al (2009).
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Table 2 – Potential Moderators of M&A Performance
Category
Deal
Characteristics

Antecedent
Payment
type

Hypothesized Relationships
When acquirer uses cash as
payment for an acquisition,
mergers will produce better
returns than when equity
(which management
presumably recognizes as
undervalued) is used.

Result
Payment type not significant in
explaining performance during
immediate term or one year periods
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997).
Moderation of cash or equity use by
acquirer not significant in short
term or long term based on 43
studies with total sample size of
7,325 ( King, Dalton, Daily et al.,
2004).

Deal
Characteristics

Deal type

Acquirers underperform after
mergers but not after tender
offers

Managerial
Effects

Managerial
ownership

Higher ownership levels by
management will lead to
improved alignment of interests
with shareholders and
positively influence merger
results.

Managerial
Effects

Managerial
experience

Amount of CEO experience or
firm experience with mergers
may impact merger results.

Environmental
Factors

Waves

Buying during merger waves,
which are periods with many
mergers, improves merger
performance.

Environmental
Factors

Regulations

Changes in regulations or
regulatory events such as new
interpretations of laws can
change the returns from M&As.

Relatedness

Resource, product or market
similarity between acquiring
and acquired firm may improve
merger performance.

CARs are small and insignificantly
different from zero, thus “no
evidence of unusual performance
from tender offers” (Agrawal, Jaffe
and Mandelker, 1992, p. 1611).
“In general, research examining the
effects of equity holdings and
incentive pay on acquisition
behavior and performance has
returned mixed results” (Haleblian,
Devers, McNamara et al, 2009., p.
481).
Moderation not indicated across
seven studies which with total
sample size of 1399 (King, Dalton,
Daily et al., 2004).
Some value can be created by
participating in a merger wave,
particularly if it is near the
beginning of the wave (Martynova
and Renneboog, 2008; McNamara,
Haleblian and Dykes, 2008).
Regulatory reforms may have
harmed bidder returns (Asquith,
Bruner, & Mullins, 1983; Malatesta
& Thompson, 1993) but may have
been beneficial to target returns
(Bradley, Desai and Kim,1988 ).
No moderation indicated in studies
with an event window at time of
announcement (thirteen studies with
2191 sample size) or up to five
years later (six studies with 455
sample size) (King, Dalton, Daily et
al., 2004).
Some studies have theorized excess

Firm
Characteristics
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returns to acquired firm
shareholders only (Barney, 1988).
Firm
Characteristics

Acquiror
Experience

Firms with more acquisition
experience will produce better
returns from M&A.

Results of initial M&As may be
positive, followed by poorer
performance on subsequent
acquisitions, until the experience
again produces positive returns
(Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002).

II.II.i Deal characteristics. When an acquirer chooses cash instead of stock as payment
for an acquisition, managers may be signaling that they believe their company’s stock is
undervalued and they expect post-acquisition performance to be stronger than the market
expects. If method of payment is a moderator of M&A success, acquisitions paid for with cash
should outperform stock acquisitions. The meta-analysis by King, Dalton, Daily et al. (2004) and
the later review of this segment of the literature by Haleblian, Devers, McNamara et al. (2009)
both concluded that the empirical support for this theory was weak.
II.II.ii Managerial effects. Another explanation for M&A performance is the impact of
management, including the level of managerial ownership and management characteristics.
Although concerns related to agency theory and management choices arise when management
ownership of equity and compensation programs do not align with shareholder interests, the
research is not conclusive on this issue (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara et al., 2009). Other
research examined management characteristics, including capabilities, knowledge, and hubris.
Some research has indicated that management characteristics influence merger returns either
negatively in the case of hubris (Hayward, Hambrick,1997) or positively in the case of previous
management experience with the target via strategic alliances (Porrini, 2004).
II.II.iii Environmental factors. Investigations into waves of mergers reveal that some
value can be created by participating in a merger wave, particularly if it is near the beginning of
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the wave (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; McNamara, Haleblian and Dykes, 2008). However,
taking advantage of the beginning of these peaks in M&A activity requires recognizing that it is
a wave and knowing that you are not nearing its end. Having this information may also be of
limited practical value to managers, as merger waves may not coincide with an acquirer’s
strategic need for an acquisition or its management’s capability to conduct a merger process.
II.II.iv Firm characteristics. Research into firm characteristics such as acquirer
experience has produced mixed but potentially interesting results. In a meta-analysis of seven
studies with a total sample size of 1,399, King, Dalton, Daily et al. (2004) did not find that the
acquiring firm management’s prior acquisition experience was a statistically significant
moderator of acquisition results after the announcement date. However, Haleblian and
Finkelstein (1999) found a U-shaped relationship between experience and performance, with
early acquisitions by a team showing good results, then poor results followed by a return to good
results. Their conclusion was that inexperienced managers improperly applied experience from
their first successful acquisition to subsequent dissimilar acquisitions, while more experienced
acquirers were able to avoid that mistake. Others believe that both individual and organizational
experience may be needed to avoid integration problems (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).
Those linking experience and M&A results have posited that experience in merging
related businesses instead of unrelated businesses brings better outcomes (Finkelstein and
Haleblian, 2002). However, Chatterjee (2009) proposed that previous studies, which relied on
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to measure relatedness, were not really measuring
relatedness. SIC codes are four digit codes used to classify companies by industry. In
Chatterjee’s view, SIC codes do not fully reflect the relatedness of companies or the similarity
of the experience acquirers gain by serial acquisitions (Chatterjee, 2009). He proposed that
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companies with carefully developed and followed acquisition programs are more successful
acquirers, and that simply making a lot of acquisitions does not lead to greater success. Instead,
developing a process and gaining experience with that process is a driver of successful M&A
results.
II.II.v Process perspective. Since M&A results are not readily explained by the
circumstances prior to the post-selection phase, some researchers have looked at the acquisition
process as driver of M&A results. This view “recognizes that the acquisition process itself is a
potentially important determinant of acquisition activities and outcomes” (Jemison and Sitkin,
1986, p. 145) and that “the content of the acquisition decision forms the upper bound on the
degree of success that an acquisition can achieve, whereas the acquisition process affects the
degree to which that potential is realized” (Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison, 1996 p. 724). Jemison and
Sitkin (1986) identified four process impediments to acquisition success:
1) activity segmentation - the segmentation of tasks which produces analyses with an
emphasis on strategic fit over organizational fit;
2) escalating momentum - forces pushing the process toward completion are strong and
lead to inadequate or poor decisions;
3) expectational ambiguity – uncertainty or differences in expectations of acquirer and
target during the integration phase can lead to unsuccessful integration;
4) management system misapplication – attitudes such as arrogance and defensiveness
lead to selection of wrong management systems or applying them in heavy handed fashion.
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) added three additional problems which they found
impact the integration process:
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1) determinism – failure to adjust to the changing circumstances in an acquisition. This
problem is characterized by a “false sense of security” (p. 124) created by the original
justification for the merger, and “confusion and frustration” (p. 126) as the situation after the
agreement to merge does not match the original justification;
2) value destruction – the environment of the merger creates uncertainty and fear among
the employees. The employees’ personal negative experience translates into a failure to help
create a successful merger;
3) leadership vacuum – the involvement of the leadership declines after the acquisition
when it is most needed, leaving operating managers to cope with the issues relating to capability
transfers without the attention of senior leadership.
Other post-selection and integration-related issues that impact M&A performance have
been found, such as management of cultural differences (Weber and Camerer, 2003; Riad, 2005),
the autonomy granted the target firm (Datta and Grant, 1990), decision maker agreement
(Shanley and Correa, 1992), evaluation of organizational differences and systematic planning for
managing them (Datta, 1991), marketing resource deployment (Capron and Hulland, 1999) and
organizational restructuring (Barkema and Schijven, 2008). Definitively settling the acquisition
performance debate is difficult, and one research team lamented that “because of the lack of
process level data typically available for a sufficiently large number of observations… prior
research in this area has established few definitive findings” (Zollo and Singh, 2004 p. 1235).
However, a few years later Lakshman (2011) concluded: “It is now well accepted that aside
from some exceptions, a remarkable number of failures in M&As are due to poor postacquisition integration” (p. 605).
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II.III Addressing Challenges
The management actions that are available to produce better acquisition outcomes depend
on the phase of the acquisition process. In the early stages of the process, when decisions such as
which target company to pursue and what the goals of an acquisition should be are being made,
possible management actions relate to the characteristics and strategic fit of the companies.
After the target selection has been made and a tentative deal structure reached, which we call the
post-selection phase, management attempts to affect acquisition outcomes must focus on the
planning and implementation of the merger.
The literature focusing on the period before the selection of a merger partner indicates
that methods of improving M&A outcomes during that period are limited. Managers can attempt
to ensure a good strategic fit between the two businesses, hire managers with acquisition
experience, time the acquisition for the beginning of a merger wave, and carefully evaluate the
national or organizational culture fit between the two companies. The decisions made in this
period may be an important determinant of the outcome of the merger and set the upper bound
for the performance of the merged companies. However, given the importance of the postselection process, and the difficulty researchers have had in finding effective pre-selection
strategies to increase merger success (Shojai, 2009), much of the literature and this dissertation
focus on the post-selection period.
Researchers have proposed solutions to potential problems in the post-selection period:
1) Managers should review their merger process to ensure it includes broadly defined
activities such as establishing strategic plans for the merger (Shrivastava, 1986) and “installing a
new sense of purpose” (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 p. 172).
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2) Other researchers identified narrower issues which they believe are important in the
acquisition process, and suggest methods to resolve these issues. Examples of this type of
treatment are communicating to reduce uncertainty (Schweiger and Denisi, 1991), redeploying
marketing managers bidirectionally between acquirer and target (Capron and Hulland, 1999),
understanding the importance of leadership (Sitkin and Pablo, 2005), and appointing an
integration manager early in the process (Teerikangas, Very and Pisano, 2011).
3) Some researchers address their solutions to a specific industry (Maire and Collerette,
2011) or for functional areas within firms such as information systems (McKiernan and Merali,
1995) or human resources (Marks and Vansteenkiste, 2008).
II.IV Positioning of Research
A variety of risk lists and other checklists have been presented in the M&A literature, and
models for using risk management have been developed for other areas of concern to
management. However, we have found no research in the M&A field that provides a framework
for using risk management techniques to manage the post-selection phase of mergers and
acquisitions. This dissertation provides such a framework.
II.IV.i Process perspective. In this dissertation, the M&As discussed using the process
perspective are those that require some degree of integration. These M&As are undertaken to
obtain the potential benefits of integration such as operating synergies or increased market
presence. Hubbard (2001) describes the four degrees of integration that can occur when
companies enter change of control transactions:
1) total autonomy policy – no physical integration of acquirer and target, control by
acquirer strictly by financial controls. The target operations remain as they were before the
merger.
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2) restructuring followed by financial controls – financial controls are put in place, and
the target company is modified via such actions as a change in management or more efficient
asset utilization.
3) centralization or integration of key functions – key departments or functions are
combined to take advantage of economies of scale, and
4) full integration – companies merged into one operation.
In the first two situations, the target is left to operate as a stand-alone entity and is not
integrated into the operations of the acquirer. In the latter two types of acquisitions some degree
of integration takes place. Risks during the post-selection phase are different for companies
undertaking some level of integration beyond financial integration than for those which are not.
Given the importance of merger integration and the corresponding importance of identifying the
risks and risk resolutions that come with integration, our research focused on the latter two
integration levels.
II.IV.ii Post-selection phase. This dissertation focuses on the risks an acquirer faces
after the selection of the merger partner, here called the post-selection phase. The post-selection
phase begins when the acquirer and target have an agreement to consummate a transaction.
Their agreement may take the form of a verbal agreement, a letter of intent, or it may be reflected
in a merger agreement. The final merger agreement usually is binding, and may even entitle the
target to compensation if the merger is not consummated (Davidoff, 2009). Although a letter of
intent often does not bind either company to complete a transaction, at this point the strategic fit
decision has been made. Our contention, which is in line with the literature, is that the postselection phase begins the process of planning for and implementing the integration of the
companies. Researchers maintain that a significant part of the potential value of M&As is

19

created or lost in the post-selection phase, and some even posit that “All value creation takes
place after the acquisition; hence the critical importance of the quality of the post-merger
integration process” (Haspeslagh 1991, p. 15). Therefore, a tool that can be used to identify and
manage the risks inherent in the process should be helpful to managers seeking to increase value
creation in M&A.

LITERATURE REVIEW: RISK MANAGEMENT
III.I Importance of Managing Risk
Managing risk is important in the management of organizations, especially when
significant, nonroutine projects are undertaken (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008). In fact, some
believe that managing risk is the essence of management (Das and Teng, 1998) The importance
of managing risk extends to the M&A process, given the degree to which the pre-selection phase
expectations of the partners are realized depends upon the process used to implement the merger
post-selection. Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison, (1996) highlight the “non routineness, speed of
decision making, and restricted use of information” of acquisitions which are “process-related
contributors to acquisition riskiness” (p. 725). Thus, “it is important that we focus on
understanding the characteristics of the acquisition process and the factors, including risk, that
influence those characteristics” (Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison, 1996, p. 724).
III.II Description of Risk
We focus on definitions of risk that emphasize the relationship of risk to decision-making
and opportunity cost. Sitkin and Pablo (1992) described risk as “a characteristic of decisions …
to which there is uncertainty about whether potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes
of decisions will be realized” (p. 10). Charette (1990) listed three conditions for risk to exist:
1) The potential for loss must exist.
2) Uncertainty with respect to the eventual outcome must be present.
3) Some choice or decision is required to deal with the uncertainty and potential for loss.
As is the case with studies of M&A outcomes, the appropriate measure of outcomes
when evaluating risk must be addressed. Some outcomes are easy to characterize, such as when
merged companies rapidly decline into bankruptcy. We evaluate that situation as a failure. But
20
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there are M&As that do not result in as definitive a decline, but instead fail to meet other
performance targets. These targets might be: earning more than the risk-adjusted cost of capital;
operating performance at or above that used to justify the merger decision; returns to the
acquiring shareholders above those which would have realized had the merger not occurred;
achieving strategic goals of the transaction; or coping with an external threat successfully as a
combined company. We include in the description of risks those outcomes that make us worse
off than the current position and outcomes which are not as good as some other outcomes that
might have been obtained (MacCrimmon, Wehrung and Stanbury, 1986).
III.III Risk Management
Organizations faced with process-related risks attempt to cope with them by the use of
risk management. Risk management is “any set of actions taken by individuals or corporations
in an effort to alter the risk arising from their business” (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008, p. 35).
Various authors have suggested risk management processes (Chapman and Ward, 2003;
MacCrimmon, Wehrung and Stanbury, 1986; Boehm, 1991; Merna and Al-Thani, 2008). These
approaches vary in detail and flexibility, but they all address three components of the risk
management process: risk identification; risk analysis; and risk response.
1.

Risk Identification

In risk identification, the risks that could impact the process are identified and their
characteristics documented. Techniques to identify risks include: probing managers or experts
via brainstorming, Delphi technique and interviews; assumption analysis; and risk registers or
checklists, which are often derived from previous experience (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008).
During the risk identification stage, a large number of risks may be identified, so risk analysis is
used to determine which risks should receive particular attention.
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2.

Risk Analysis

In risk analysis, the probability of loss and the magnitude of the potential loss are
assessed for the previously identified risks (Boehm, 1991). Risk analysis can emphasize
quantitative or qualitative analysis. Quantitative techniques “attempt to determine absolute value
ranges together with probability distributions” (Merna and Al-Thani, 2008, pg. 56) for the impact
of risks on the results of the project. Quantitative techniques include decision trees, Monte Carlo
simulation, sensitivity analysis, and probability-impact grid analysis (Merna and Al-Thani,
2008). Users of qualitative techniques seek relative values as opposed to absolute values for the
impact of these risks. Qualitative techniques include checklists, risk registers, Delphi and
probability-impact tables.
Boehm (1991) developed a qualitative technique to analyze the risk exposure of software
projects. With this technique, the level of risk affecting a project outcome and the amount of the
loss are used to determine the risk exposure (RE) of a project. This can be stated as the formula
RE = P(UO) x L(UO),
where P(UO) is the level of risk affecting a project outcome, and L(UO) is the amount of the loss
which would result from the risk.
After developing impact and probability estimates for each risk, managers can rank order
them by risk exposure to assist in developing the risk management plan for the project. This
method has been used to study software-related project risks (Boehm, 1991; Keil, Cule,
Lyytinen et al., 1998; Persson, Mathiassen, Boeg et al., 2009), to evaluate risks between rather
than within projects (Baccarini and Archer, 2001), and in post-merger IT integration by
(Alaranta and Mathiassen, 2011).

23

Some project management scholars are skeptical of qualitative evaluations using the
probability-impact technique. They believe the probability-impact approach “delivers very little
useful information and even less real insight” (Chapman and Ward, 2000, p. 294). They object
to the noniterative use of probability impacts. They maintain this may produce crude estimates of
probability and impact which are then obscured when risk exposure estimates from different
risks are combining into indices. They are also concerned about the process used to elicit the
probability and impact ratings from managers. Their concern is that the concepts of low, medium
and high are not clearly understood to be the same by all the managers who are asked to use
those measures in evaluating a project (Chapman and Ward, 2003, p. 170).
Researchers who have used qualitative evaluations have recognized or attempted to
mitigate these concerns. In many circumstances, exact probabilities cannot be determined in a
timely and cost effective manner, so a quantitative approach is not an option. Exact probabilities
may not be needed to guide management action, as the relative importance of risk factors may be
sufficient to guide management. Probability measures of risk and more accurate dollar measures
of impact may be important in deciding which proposed project to pursue, as when providing
sensitivity analysis or project profitability projections to the Board of Directors. However, once
a project has been selected, Boehm’s approach is often an appropriate risk management tool.
Some researchers have also conducted an iterative process, during which the meanings of risk
constructs are evaluated and refined (Persson, Mathiassen, Boeg et al., 2009; Harris, 2007).
3.

Risk Response

In the risk response stage, a plan is developed to eliminate, resolve or mitigate the risks
where possible. This can also be referred to as the risk control step (Boehm, 1991) or a risk
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response planning phase (PMBOK Guide:2000 Chapter 11). The techniques used in this stage
include:
1) risk avoidance, which is removing a threat either by avoiding projects exposed to that
risk or removing it from the project;
2) risk reduction, lowering the likelihood or impact of a risk;
3) risk transfer, shifting or sharing the risk with others through insurance or contractual
arrangements, and
4) risk retention, retaining the risk unintentionally due to failure to manage the risk
analysis or risk identification stages, or intentionally in order to reap the benefits which come
with bearing that risk (Boehm, 1991; Merna and Al-Thani, 2008).
III.IV Risk Management in M&A
The logical model prevalent in risk management literature assumed that decision makers
manage risks in a consistent manner by evaluating expected risks and returns, with only the best
interests of the company and its shareholders in mind. Under this decision theoretic conception
of risk, “two decision makers viewing the same acquisition candidate… should arrive at
essentially the same objective risk profile” (Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison, 1996, p. 730). However,
further research has explored differences between the logical model and actual management
decision processes regarding risk management and M&A. One such difference is when
managers work to reduce their own personal risk, such as the risk of losing their job, by engaging
in mergers whose returns do not justify the risk incurred by their company (Amihud and Lev,
1981). MacCrimmon, Wehrung and Stanbury (1986) determined that the decisions executives
make in risky situations differ from those based strictly on the expected value of the possible
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results. They also found that the risk propensity of decision makers, who they characterized as
risk seekers and risk avoiders, influences their perception of the risk level of a decision.
March and Shapira (1987) showed that managers’ approach to risk differs from the
logical model in several ways. First, many managers do not consider the possible positive
outcomes from a decision as an important component of risk, but instead focus on the negative
possibilities. If a manager is only considering a portion of the possible outcomes, her decision
process is not using accurate probability distributions. Second, managers view risk more in
terms of the magnitude of possible losses than in terms of a probability concept. Third, managers
do not view risk as something that is readily or usefully quantifiable, either using expected value
or other constructs. Sitkin and Pablo (1992) noted that the likelihood of extreme outcomes are
often overweighed by individuals. They also theorize that the behavior of decision makers is
guided by their risk propensity, another deviation from the decision theoretic conception of
management behavior.
Researchers have examined managements’ risk management decision-making in the
M&A process. When Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison (1996) looked at risk management during
acquisitions, they found that managers in M&A situations use risk responses mentioned in the
risk management literature such as “exerting influence, developing additional decision
alternatives, delaying, and risk-sharing” (Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison, 1996 p. 735).
As discussed earlier, M&A decision makers often have to anticipate or respond to three
characteristics of the M&A process: escalating momentum; fragmented perspectives; and
ambiguous expectations (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Pablo, Sitkin and Jemison (1996) argue that
responses to these M&A risks are moderated by the decision makers’ risk propensities. For
example, high perceived risk in an acquisition situation leads to the use of risk adjustment
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techniques, such as delaying the transaction or seeking more information. If the decision maker
is risk averse, she will be more likely to seek to reduce the escalating momentum than a riskseeking decision maker. Thus risk has been recognized as important in the acquisition process,
the importance of the behavioral decision model has been established in the M&A post-selection
phase, and the model has been linked to specific issues such as risk propensities and perceived
riskiness. It appears that managers in M&A situation do not demonstrate strict adherence to the
logical model.
Harris (2007) looked at managers’ risk perceptions of acquisitions made as part of an
acquisition program. Working with the management team of a company, she helped them
identify risk constructs to develop risk profiles for past and future acquisitions. By rating each of
the four recent acquisitions in which the management team had participated, they were able to
score the relative riskiness of each acquisition and identify areas where the risk might be
managed during the acquisition process. They concluded that the twelve risk constructs they
developed reflected the management teams’ perception of which risk areas were important for
their acquisitions. They also concluded that this exercise would be more valuable if used as part
of the acquisition process rather than to review past acquisitions.
Alaranta and Mathiassen (2011) developed a risk management framework for IS
integration in the post-merger phase that involved a four step process:
1) characterizing the situation by evaluating the likelihood that identified risks may
present themselves,
2) analyzing the risks by using the management teams’ perceptions of the degree of risk
presented by each risk item to develop a risk profile,
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3) prioritizing the resolution actions to be taken based on the risk profile, and
4) taking action by revising the integration plan based on the results of the previous steps
in the risk management process.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This study sought to develop a risk management framework for use in the post-selection
phase of mergers and acquisitions. We first conducted a systematic literature review to determine
the risks and risk resolutions suggested for the M&A area. Next we synthesized the risks and risk
resolutions into twelve risk areas and twelve risk resolution areas. We then interviewed M&A
practitioners to validate the risks and risk resolution constructs. Our next step as to develop a
risk management framework based on the constructs. Finally, we evaluated the framework by
applying it using published case studies. Table 3 summarizes the research process we used to
develop and evaluate the framework.
Table 3 – Research Path to Develop and Evaluate Risk Management Framework
Stage Dissertation Section Description of Stage

Research Technique

1

Chapter V

Synthesizing Risks and Risk Resolutions

Literature Review

2

Chapter VI

Evaluating Constructs

Interviews

3

Chapter VII

Developing Risk Management Framework Analysis

4

Chapter VIII

Evaluating Framework

Case Study Analysis

IV.I Literature Review
We conducted a literature review to determine what risks and risk resolution techniques
have been identified in the literature. We also determined how risks and risk resolution
techniques are currently linked in the literature. We did this by conducting a systematic review
of the literature based on concepts (Webster and Watson, 2002). Literature reviews have been
used extensively in management and M&A-related research. For example, Haleblian, Devers,
McNamara et al. (2009) conducted a literature review of the M&A field. In addition to the
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M&A articles they examined, they took note of twelve additional literature reviews which, while
primarily focused on other subjects, included M&A as a facet of the review.
IV.I.i Identifying the literature. We designed the initial computer-based search to
screen broadly in order to decrease the likelihood that relevant articles would be missed. We then
found the relevant articles by reviewing the screened articles. Following the search strategy
suggested by Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003), we identified keywords and search terms,
determined the appropriate search strings, reported the search strategy in enough detail to allow
replication, and developed a full listing of the papers produced by the search. The keywords
chosen were “acquisition”, “merger”, “process”, “performance” and “risk.” The search terms
chosen were words beginning with either “acquisition” or “merger”, so documents containing the
plural acquisitions and mergers were also selected. If any of the words “process”, “performance”
or “risk” were found in addition to the “acquisition” or “merger” the article was selected in the
initial pass.
Our search consisted of all journals in the Web of Science database from 1992 through
2011 in the business, management, organizational change and related fields. As such, the search
was not limited to the top journals. The search was conducted in the Title, Abstract, and
Keywords fields of the articles. This initial search yielded 2,865 articles. The search parameters
and logic for the keywords and Web of Science categories are listed in Table 4.
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Table 4 – Search Terms, Parameters and Logic
Initial search to yield 2,865 articles:
1.Topic=(merger* AND risk*) OR Topic=(acquisition* AND risk*) OR Topic=(merger* AND
performance) OR Topic=(acquisition* AND performance) OR Topic=(merger* AND process) OR
Topic=(acquisition* AND process)
2. Excluded non-business topics by specifically including only:
Web of Science Categories=( COMPUTER SCIENCE SOFTWARE ENGINEERING OR
MANAGEMENT OR BUSINESS OR ECONOMICS OR BUSINESS FINANCE ) AND Web of Science
Categories=( MANAGEMENT OR BUSINESS OR ECONOMICS OR BUSINESS FINANCE OR
COMPUTER SCIENCE SOFTWARE ENGINEERING OR OPERATIONS RESEARCH
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE OR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LABOR OR COMPUTER SCIENCE
INFORMATION SYSTEMS ) AND Subject Areas=( BUSINESS ECONOMICS OR COMPUTER
SCIENCE OR OPERATIONS RESEARCH MANAGEMENT SCIENCE OR ENGINEERING OR
PSYCHOLOGY ) AND Document Type=( ARTICLE OR PROCEEDINGS PAPER )
Databases=SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI Timespan=1992-2011

The titles of the 2,865 articles were then reviewed for their relevance to: 1) mergers and
acquisitions; 2) risk and risk management; and 3) to the post-selection phase of M&A. This
review is listed as Step B in Table 35 below. Because of the broad keyword search initially
conducted and the many subject areas included, the titles of many articles indicated they clearly
fell outside the scope of this review. For example, articles titled “Small business credit scoring”
(Berger and Frame, 2007) and “Multiscale neurofuzzy models for forecasting in time series
databases” (Kumar, Agrawal and Joshi, 2007) were both identified in the initial search, but
examination of the titles quickly revealed that they should be removed from the review.
When examination of the title was not conclusive, the article abstracts were also
reviewed. The title and abstract reviews reduced the possibly relevant articles to 177. We did not
exclude articles based on their research methodology or design. A further analysis by reading
the 177 articles and applying the three criteria resulted in 123 articles of interest (Step C). We
then sought to capture potentially important additional articles not previously uncovered,
including those published before 1992. To do so, we reviewed the citations of the 123 articles
resulting from Step B and evaluated any which were cited by ten or more of the 123 articles. We
used the same criteria as when we evaluated the original 2,865 articles. This added an additional
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14 articles (Step D). Finally, 12 articles previously not evaluated were added as a result of a
review of articles encountered while conducting this research (Step E). In total, 149 articles
contributed one or more risks or risk resolutions. The 149 resources used are listed in Appendix
A.

Process
Step
A
B
C
D

E

Table 5 – Literature Selection Process
Step description
Change in number of
articles
Web of Science key word search
2,865
Title and abstract reviewed to
(2,688)
determine potentially relevant articles
Reviewed articles for risk or risk
(54)
resolutions
Reviewed 29 articles referenced by
14
ten or more of the 177 articles
resulting from Step B
Added articles found with relevant
12
risks or resolutions

Net articles
2,865
177
123
137

149

This search process had several limitations. The Web of Science does not index every published
research article or journal and does not cover articles published prior to 1992. Other
combinations of keywords may have cast a wider net and yielded additional relevant articles.
However, as discussed later, the articles chosen captured almost all of the risks and resolutions
offered by the practitioners interviewed for this study, which provides some comfort that the
literature search yielded appropriate results.
IV.I.ii Identifying risks and risk resolutions. We reviewed the 149 selected articles for
risks and risk resolutions in the post-selection phase of mergers and listed those risks. Our
coding of each document started with any mention of risks which could impact M&A success.
We then confirmed that the risk was relevant to the post-selection phase of the M&A process.
We also looked for risk resolutions, and where the authors provided actions that could be
considered a risk resolution, those suggested resolutions were listed next to the risks. We linked
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risks and risk resolutions when an explicit link was proposed by the article’s author. When the
author did not link a risk resolution to a particular risk, we linked them based on our evaluation
of the similarity of the situations described by the authors. In reviewing the literature we were
able to use our experience in mergers and acquisitions to aid in risk and risk resolution
identification and avoid off-topic articles and concepts.
It is possible that we failed to identify some of the risks and resolutions contained in the
reviewed literature. However, given the numerous times most of the risks and risk resolutions
were mentioned in the literature, we should have found any missed risks and risk resolutions
elsewhere in our literature review. In that event, finding an additional occurrence of a risk or
risk resolution would likely not have changed our compilation or synthesis of risks and risk
resolutions.
IV.II Interviews
To determine if the risks and risk resolutions we derived from the literature were
complete, we conducted semi-structured, focused interviews with five experienced M&A
participants. Our interviews followed the Merton and Kendall (1946) focused interview outline
in that:
1) Our interviewees were “known to have been involved” (p. 541) in M&A situations,
2) Through our literature review, we had “previously analyzed” (p. 541) the situation. In
their outline, Merton and Kendall (1946) suggest that the interviewer should have analyzed
“significant elements” of the situation prior to conducting the interviews. We did this through
our literature review and classification process.
3) We prepared an interview guide based on our literature review,
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4) The interview focused on the experiences of the interviewee to both test our previous
conclusions and to “ascertain unanticipated responses” (p. 541), which in our case would
be risks and risk resolutions we had not previously uncovered.
IV.II.i Interview procedure. We asked the interviewees to discuss the risks they have
encountered in M&A and the risk resolutions that were most important for their companies. We
did not initially share the risks and resolutions from the literature with the interviewees in order
to record their impressions without influence from our literature review.
Interviewees were asked what risks they believe threatened or, if ignored, could have
threatened the success of mergers they have managed.

We inquired about mergers which

failed or did not live up to expectations. We sought reasons for the underperformance and we
asked them what resolutions they have used to mitigate or resolve these risks. Only then did we
ask them to comment on the list of risks and resolutions we had derived from the literature. See
Appendix D for examples of interview questions. These interviews lasted for one to two hours.
They were recorded and transcribed.
IV.II.ii Interviewees. The interviews were used to determine if the risks and risk
resolutions obtained from the literature review have been experienced by M&A practitioners. We
interviewed five practitioners who have been responsible for M&A transactions at a senior level.
All interviewees have led management teams in M&A transactions in which significant
integration of the acquirer and acquiree was planned. All of the interviewees are currently
involved with companies who participate in M&A. We selected interviewees with significant
experience who would be likely to be able to recall risks and resolutions from numerous M&A
situations in which they had been involved. We believe this provided us with a substantial review
of our risks and resolutions, evidenced by the significant overlap between their unprompted
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identification of risks and resolutions and those from the literature. We did not attempt to
provide a statistically significant sample of interviewees. Table 6 provides further details about
the interviewees.
Table 6 – Interviewee Summary
ID Title

Years of M&A
Experience
10+

Type of Firm

Nature of experience

Distribution company

Led deal team while company sold to
publicly traded company. Led deal
team while numerous acquisitions
made.
Senior manager at manufacturing
companies involved in M&A
transactions.
Senior manager and deal team leader of
several companies both as acquirer and
acquiree.
Led deal team or assisted in
acquisitions or divestitures of over a
dozen companies.
Integration Manager for numerous
acquisitions.

A

Chief
Financial
Officer

B

Partner

20+

Management
Consulting

C

Managing
Director

15+

Private Equity and
Investment Banking

D

Managing
Director

15+

Private Equity Firm

E

Partner

10+

Retailer, Distribution
company and
Investment Banking

IV.III Case Study Reviews
We reviewed four published case studies to evaluate the results of our literature
review, interviews, and synthesis of risks and risk resolution categories. Although we did not
conduct the case studies ourselves, in our review of the case studies we followed the principles
of case study data collection from Yin (2009, p. 114-122):
1) Our use of the case studies in addition to the literature and interviews constitutes a use
of multiple sources of evidence,
2) We created a case study database to organize the data we collected from the case
studies, and
3) We have maintained a chain of evidence to allow observers to trace our evidence.
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IV.III.i. Case studies. Given that this engaged scholarship research provides a
framework to help solve a problem faced by practitioners, we evaluated the framework using
case studies which featured actual, identified M&A transactions. To select the case studies we
searched Ivey’s database of publications. From the initial database of 5,886 in October, 2012, we
eliminated those that were not written in English or were reports or articles and not cases (Steps
B and C in Table 7 below). Of the 3,754 cases, we searched those with “Merger and Acquisition
Themes” and that mentioned the word “integration” (Steps D and E). Twenty-six cases met these
criteria. Given almost all of our interviews with practitioners concerned M&A situations where
at least one of the parties was North American, we chose to limit the possible cases to those
categorized by Ivey as “North American and Caribbean.” Of the sixteen remaining cases, we
eliminated eleven as inappropriate based on either their narrow focus (accounting aspects of a
merger, IT integration), insufficient information in the case on which to conduct an analysis, or
because the case did not focus on the post-selection phase. We chose four of the five remaining
cases based on their focus on the post-selection phase and the amount of information concerning
integration-related issues they provided. The steps of the process are summarized in Table 7
below:
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Table 7 – Case Search Terms and Parameters
Process Step description
Step
A

All Ivey Publishing Publications

Change in
Net articles
number of
publications
5,886
5,886

B

English language only

(996)

4,890

C

Selected “Cases” only

(1,136)

3,754

D

With M&A Themes

(3,653)

101

E

Keyword search “Integration”

(75)

26

F

Chose North America and Caribbean articles

(10)

16

G

Reviewed to eliminate inappropriate cases

(11)

5

H

Selected cases with rich detail, focus on post-selection phase (1)

4

We evaluated the framework by looking at four case studies of companies developing
their integration strategies for a proposed merger. We compared the risks presented in the cases
with the risk areas in the framework. We then compared the risk resolution strategies
contemplated by the managers in the profiled companies with those developed for our
framework. We sought to determine if the risks and risk resolutions and the framework we
developed might have been useful in the risk management process of the M&As presented in the
cases.
IV.III.ii Case descriptions. Table 8 provides a summary of each of the four cases used
to evaluate the framework.
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Table 8 – Case Descriptions
Case

Industry

Bombardier Rail car
manufacturing

Deloitte

Accounting
services

Dow

Specialty
chemicals

Unity

Stockholder
transfer
agency
services

Size

Description

Reference

Bombardier
revenue $3.45B
Cdn

Bombardier (Canada) purchased
AdTranz (Germany) to expand
geographic scope, increase its
competencies in some technical
areas and complete its product
portfolio.
Deloitte (Canada) absorbed Arthur
Andersen (Canada) after AA’s
dissolution as a result of the Enron
scandal.

Merrison
and Barnett,
2004

Dow (U.S. based) acquired Wolff
Walsrode (Germany) in 2007 to add
to Dow’s cellulosic unit and
strengthen its footprint in Central
and Eastern Europe

Heimeriks
and Gate,
2010

Unity, (South Africa), purchased
Delta (United States). The objective
of the acquisition was to achieve
gains through synergies, economies
of scale, financial and marketing
advantages, revenue diversification
and reduced earnings volatility.
Integration of the two firms’
numerous information systems was
seen as a crucial part of the merger,
but was a concern due to the many
systems used by the two companies
and the lack of compatibility of the
systems.

Haggerty
and Fong,
2009

Arthur Andersen
billings estimated
$100Cdn to $180
Cdn, combined
entities about Cdn
$1.1 billion.
Dow revenue $49
billion, Dow
acquiring unit had
$650 million sales,
Wolff unit had
$500 million sales.
Unity had $2B in
sales

Seijts and
Monk, 2004

SYNTHESIZING RISKS AND RISK RESOLUTIONS

To synthesize the risks and risk resolutions into risk categories, we identified the risks
and risk resolutions in the literature, categorized the identified risks and risk resolution
techniques, and linked the risk resolution techniques to the risk categories.
V.I Conceptualizing Risks
We conceptualized risks using Pettigrew’s content, context and process categorizations
(Pettigrew, 1987). We considered risk as per Charette (1990) where risk is considered to be
present only when: the potential for loss exists; uncertainty with respect to the eventual outcome
is present; and some choice or decision is required to deal with the uncertainty and potential for
loss.
Using Pettigrew’s method of analyzing organizational change by first dividing the areas
to be investigated into categories of content, context and process of change, we categorized risk
in the M&A process into those three areas.
1) Context refers to the internal and external environment in which the firm operates, and
could also be considered the “why” of change.
2) Content refers to the area of the firm being examined, such as corporate culture,
marketing or technical or functional areas. The “what” of change is addressed in the content area.
3) Process refers to the activity the firm is conducting to effect the change, which in this
research is the merger process. Pettigrew considered process the “how” of change (Pettigrew,
1987).
Pettigrew’s framework was developed for the analysis of the “transformation of the firm”
(Pettigrew, 1987 p. 658) including mergers. It has been successfully used to categorize risk areas
38

39

in post-merger integration (Alaranta and Mathiassen, 2011) , and fits well the task of
categorizing process risks in M&A. The following discusses the risks we found in more detail,
conceptualized using Pettigrew’s categorizations, and synthesized into risk areas:
V.I.i Content risks.
1.1

Systems Compatibility Risk

A merger may require the integration of numerous systems. It is not surprising that two
firms, having spent years developing their own operating policies, employee compensation
schemes, and bricks and mortar facilities, would have developed management systems which are
incompatible and difficult to combine. The potential inefficiencies arising from the process of
combining them can create systems compatibility risk. These risks can be in areas as disparate
as the factory floor (Zhang, Fleet, Shi et al., 2010), information systems (Stylianou, Jeffries and
Robbins, 1996), the technology assets expected to contribute most to the value to be derived
from the merger (James, Georghiou and Metcalfe, 1998) and R&D synergies (Slowinski, Rafii,
Tao et al., 2002).
1.2

Integration Bias Risk

This risk results when one of the merger partners dominates the integration decisions, or
when one functional area exercises domination. Examples of this risk include integration
decisions made under the influence of hubris (Colombo, Conca, Buongiorno et al., 2007; James,
Georghiou and Metcalfe, 1998), using underqualified consultants (Slowinski, Rafii, Tao et al.,
2002) and imposing management systems on the target (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Integration
bias can also exacerbate systems compatibility risk, for example, when the acquirer assumes its
management systems are superior and that the fault for the inefficiency or difficulty in
combining them lies with the inferior target company (James, Georghiou and Metcalfe, 1998).
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1.3

Organizational Culture Risk

The common assumptions held by a group, which help make up its organizational
culture, can lead to “…meaning, stability and comfort; the anxiety that results from the inability
to understand or predict events happening around the group is reduced” (Schein, 1990 p. 111).
But when an organization’s culture is upset, it may not be surprising for the corporate
environment to change. And in fact the maladies attributed to organizational culture differences
include shock (Bastien, Hostager and Miles, 1996), stress (Weber, Tarba and Bachar, 2011), and
alienation and disconnectedness (Brannen and Peterson, 2009). Even when merging firms
occupy similar positions in the same industry, such as professional service firms (Ashkanasy
and Holmes, 1995), or have the same position in the supply chain, as with merging retailers or
manufacturers, organizational culture risks can abound. Clashes can occur when the target
employees fail to accept the acquirer culture (Pioch, 2007) or actively resist it (Gates and Very,
2003).
1.4

National Culture Risk

Differences in the national cultures of two merging firms have been blamed for a variety
of suboptimal merger results. The risks from national culture differences can cause problems
when a common language is adopted for the combined companies and those who don’t speak the
chosen language well are disadvantaged (Piekkari, Vaara, Tienari et al., 2005). Language
difficulties can also lead to communication failures due to nuances in linguistic patterns which
go unappreciated (Irrmann, 2005). In addition to language-related difficulties, national culture
differences can impede learning (Reus and Lamont, 2009), create difficulty regarding
compensation issues (Tetenbaum, 1999) and cause socio-cultural differences to cause issues
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other than integration to take priority (Maire and Collerette, 2011). Table 9 details the Content
Risk Areas, Definitions and references selected literature support for the risks.
Table 9 – Summary of Content Risks by Category

Risk
#

Risk
Name

1.1

Systems
Compatibility
Risk

1.2

Integration
Bias
Risk

1.3

Organizational
Culture
Risk

1.4

National
Culture
Risk

Risk Definition

Literature Support

Merging firms have
practices, systems, reward
systems or operating
policies which are so
incompatible integration
problems are created.
Integration decisions are
dominated by one party or
by limited business,
technical or functional
areas.

Failure to realize value from technology assets (130)
Consolidation impacts factory efficiency (147)
IS merger process not smooth (127)
Functional integration is disruptive (121)

Merger process or
integration is hampered or
resisted due to differences
in corporate cultures.
Merger process or
integration is negatively
impacted by differences in
nationalities, language or
culture.

Corporate Cultural Clashes (20,24)
Lack of acceptance of corporate culture by acquired
company employees (108)
Firms risk propensity profiles are different (105)
National culture differences (1,98,115)
National cultural differences are tacit (99)
Cultural mismatches individualism v. collectivism (27)

Acquirer hubris (37,72,98,83)
Management system misapplication (73)
Overuse of underqualified consultants (123)
Acquirer doesn't value acquiree processes and systems
(97)
Focus on cost synergies at expense of HR IT systems (23)

Numbers in parentheses reference articles in Appendix A

V.I.ii. Context risks.
2.1

Customer Relationship Risk

A context risk that may be faced by merging companies is one which relates to their
relationships with their customers. The company faces the risk that relationships with customers
will deteriorate due to unanswered customer concerns about the impact of the merger (Anderson,
Havila and Salmi, 2001; Burgelman and McKinney, 2006), customer alienation (Bastien,
Hostager and Miles, 1996), and the departure of key employees who maintain customer
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relationships (Zhang, Fleet, Shi et al., 2010). The integration process can also cause new product
launches to be delayed (Graebner, 2004), which can create customer uncertainty (Homburg and
Bucerius, 2005).
2.2

Contextual Ignorance Risk

Contextual ignorance can be a risk when the circumstances outside the company are not
adequately understood by the merger partners, or insufficiently attended to during the merger
process. While it is usually not advisable for a company to ignore the context in which it operates
as it conducts its everyday business, to do so while undergoing the significant organizational
change which may accompany a merger can be even more risky. Contextual ignorance can lead
to a failure to anticipate and counter competitors’ reactions to the merger (Gates and Very,
2003), a belated realization that the merged company will not have a competitive cost structure
(Cullinan, Le Roux and Weddigen, 2004), or a failure to take advantage of growth opportunities
(Chatzkel and Saint-Onge, 2007).
2.3

Adverse Behavior Risk

Adverse behavior risk refers to employee behavior that negatively impacts company
performance. This behavior can take the form of the top management team or other key
employees leaving as a result of the merger (Napier, 1989; (Schweiger, Ivancevich and Power,
1987; (Vermeulen, 2005). The employees who remain may resist the merger and the change it
brings (Giessner, 2011), become disaffected (Chun and Davies, 2010), or allocate their efforts to
seeking benefits for themselves, a practice known as rent-seeking (Meyer, 2008). Innovation can
be hurt if technical employees are not managed properly (Kreiner and Lee, 2000) or leave the
firm (James, Georghiou and Metcalfe, 1998).
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2.4

External Stakeholder Risk

External stakeholder risks can be of concern when outside stakeholders do not support,
understand or collaborate with the merger process. Instances when this can create difficulties
include union relationships which negatively impact performance (Antila, 2006) and
stakeholders who do not believe or understand the reasons for the merger (Vaara and Monin,
2010).
Table 10 – Summary of Context Risks by Category
Risk
#

Risk
Name

Risk Definition

Literature Support

2.1

Customer
Relationships
Risk

Customer relationships are negatively
impacted by the merger.

Customers and suppliers
concerned about merger (7)
Customer uncertainty (68)
New product launch delays
(58)
Customer alienation (20)

2.2

Contextual
Ignorance
Risk

Contexts outside the company are not
adequately understood or are
insufficiently attended to during the
merger process.

Competitor reactions
(18,55)
Business environment
changes negatively (30)
Existing relationships can't
be changed (51)
Emphasis on cost savings
leads to ignoring or
eliminating opportunities for
growth (38)

2.3

Adverse
Behavior
Risk

Employee behavior due to the merger
process negatively impacts company
performance during and after the merger
process.

2.4

External Stakeholder
Risk

Merger syndrome causes
negative employee reactions
(28)
Loss of talent (23)
Disaffected group of
employees (41)
Merger survivors coping
difficulty (53)
Reallocated effort to rentseeking (95)
Competitor reactions during
our merger (20)
Union relationships
negatively impact
performance (9)

Outside stakeholders do not support,
understand or collaborate with the
process.
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Acquirer team perceived by
acquired e/e to lack authority
(50)
Uncooperative target
management during due
diligence (45)

V.I.iii Process risks.
3.1

Process Management Risk

Mergers requiring integration undergo some formal or informal process to combine the
two companies. Inadequate management of this merger process, or process management risk, is
the focus of many analyses in the literature. This risk encompasses a wide variety of
management sins which can lead to merger process problems ranging from inefficiencies to
failure. Risk arises when employees allocate too much time to the post-merger integration
process (Meyer, 2008) or the merger process disrupts the normal work cycle or occurs during the
busy season (Greenwood, Hinings and Brown, 1994). Diversion of management attention can
retard post-acquisition growth (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2009) or detract from the company’s
emphasis on its core mission (Yu, Engleman and Van de Ven, 2005). Poor integration
performance can be the result of a failure to consistently and actively manage the integration
process (Bannert and Tschirky, 2004; Ashkenas and Francis, 2000) as well as using the wrong
integration approach (Al-Laham, Schweizer and Amburgey, 2010). When managers of the
process fail to provide sufficient about the tasks at hand and evaluate subordinate performance
the process can suffer from “information constipation” (Bastien, Hostager and Miles, 1996 p.
265).
3.2

Integration Timing

Integration timing risks are present when inadequate attention is paid to the timeliness of
the planning and implementation of the integration. The importance of proper management of
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timing is illustrated by concerns that integration can go too fast when the companies do not know
each other well before the merger (Al-Laham, Schweizer and Amburgey, 2010) or teams have
not been coached well on how to work together (Miles and Bennett, 2008). Conversely, a slow
integration process can exacerbate “merger syndrome,” which is a plague of fear and uncertainty
among employees of acquired firms (Marks and Mirvis, 1985; Colombo, Conca, Buongiorno et
al., 2007). In addition to the risk that the process will go too fast or too slow, mergers can also
suffer from inadequate or delayed planning of the process (Ashkanasy and Holmes, 1995; Aiello
and Watkins, 2000; Calori, Lubatkin and Very, 1994). Finally, “escalating momentum” can lead
to less than adequate consideration of integration issues and premature conclusions (Jemison and
Sitkin, 1986).
3.3

Resources Shortfall Risk

During the merger processes, new merger-related tasks are undertaken at both companies.
At the same time, many of the routine activities of the firm must continue as before. Some of
these ongoing activities are made even more time-consuming and difficult due to the impact of
the merger. As a result of this limited slack, there may be too little management talent for the
integration tasks (Kitching, 1967) or the integration team may be too small (Vester, 2002).
Resources shortfall risk can also manifest themselves as task overload (Bastien, Hostager and
Miles, 1996), implementing too many value creating strategies simultaneously (Ambrosini,
Bowman and Schoenberg, 2011), or too much integration leading to too little slack (Shaver,
2006). Regardless of how they are characterized, this mismatch between tasks and resources can
lead to a failure to achieve economies of scope (Gary, 2005), inhibit knowledge transfer (Azan
and Sutter, 2010), or overwhelm the HR function (Vester, 2002).
3.4

Political Escalation Risk
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Political escalation risk occurs when significant political struggles develop over which
company’s management systems to use. Examples of these management systems include
processes, practices and computer systems. Political escalation can occur as a result of
preference being given to the acquirer’s employees (Allred, Boal and Holstein, 2005), when
reductions in force are not evaluated as fair (Buono, 2003), or when acquired company managers
are given excessive autonomy (Meyer, 2008). It can manifest itself as an integration sabotaged
by cliques (Miles and Bennett, 2008), resistance to change (Lupina-Wegener, Schneider and van
Dick, 2011; Vaara, 2003) or destructive effects on the integration process (Weber, 1996).
Table 11 – Summary of Process Risks by Category

Process Risks
Risk Definition

Risk
#

Risk
Name

Literature Support

3.1

Process Management
Risk

Inadequate management
action or leadership of
the merger process leads
to a significant departure
from merger goals.

Failure to plan for integration during due diligence
period (2)
Due diligence lack of detail (2)
Escalating commitment or overcommitment (65)
Wrong integration approach (4)
Integration process difficult (137)

3.2

Integration Timing
Risk

Timeliness of the
planning for and
implementation of the
integration is inadequate.

Escalating momentum leads to premature conclusions
(73)
Speed of integration too fast (4,10)
Integration slow and costly (12)
Integration process stalled (114)
Delayed Integration Planning (32)

3.3

Resources Shortfall
Risk

There is insufficient
slack, resources or skills
to properly prosecute the
integration program or
realize expected benefits
of the merger

Overintegration leads to too little slack (119)
Insufficient size of integration team (138)
Task overload (20)
Too little management talent for integration task (74)
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3.4

Political Escalation
Risk

Political struggles over
which company’s
management systems to
use

Excessive autonomy - acquired managers fight to
retain independence (95)
Lack of common purpose between acquirer and
acquiree (92)
Integration sabotaged by cliques (98)
Not-invented here syndrome (138)
Preference given to acquirer company employees (5)

V.II Conceptualizing Risk Resolution Techniques
Risk resolution techniques were mentioned over four hundred times in the reviewed
literature, counting duplicate mentions of the same or similar techniques in different sources. The
following sections present a summary of the risk resolution techniques using the Content,
Context and Process categories.
V.II.i Content. Risk resolutions related to content risks are focused mostly on what
should be done during the merger process. The resolution strategies are to: analyze and design
systems early; adopt a systematic evaluation process; plan and cultivate collaboration; and
manage cultural diversity. For many companies, a merger is an unusual event, so the planning
and control mechanisms routinely used within the company for their business may not be
relevant. To counteract this, several of the risk resolution techniques proposed for contentrelated risks call for developing a program designed on a case-specific basis to address the risks
(Slowinski, Rafii, Tao et al., 2002; Colombo, Conca, Buongiorno et al., 2007), developing an
integration tracking process (Gates and Very, 2003) and carefully codify the process (Zollo and
Singh, 2004; Zollo, 2009).
All four of the content risks have at least one resolution action advising that managers should be
involved earlier in the process, such as the R&D manager for technical acquisitions (Slowinski,
Rafii, Tao et al., 2002), IS personnel in pre-merger planning (Stylianou, Jeffries and Robbins,
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1996), operating managers on the integration team (Marks and Mirvis, 2001), and HR managers
involved early (Tetenbaum, 1999).
V.II.ii Context. One set of resolution techniques for context risks encourages early
engagement with important constituencies such as employees with key customer relationships,
customers, competitors, suppliers and unions (Zhang, Fleet, Shi et al., 2010; James, Georghiou
and Metcalfe, 1998; Slowinski, Rafii, Tao et al., 2002; Antila, 2006). The form and substance
of communications are also addressed, as with advice to communicate the purpose of the merger
frequently (Pablo, 1994), to vary communications strategies for certain constituencies (Chun and
Davies, 2010), for managers to tell the truth (Schweiger, Ivancevich and Power, 1987), and to
consider these communications to be on ongoing process and not a one-time event (Vaara and
Monin, 2010).
V.II.iii Process. The resolutions for the process risk category highlighted the importance
of the integration and leadership teams, including their role, composition, and the timing of their
formation and dissolution. These resolutions suggest the appointment of an integration manager
as well as a dedicated merger integration team or mini-integration teams (Ashkenas and Francis,
2000; Vester, 2002). The integration team should include key employees of the target (Raukko,
2009), including additional human resources staff (Vester, 2002). A strategic leadership team
should be appointed immediately and integration teams should be maintained well after the
merger date (Burgelman and McKinney, 2006). The integration process should be systematic
(Shrivastava, 1986) and a merger intent document should be prepared which outlines
expectations and holds people accountable (Ashkenas, Francis and Heinick, 2011).
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V.III Risks and Risk Resolution Techniques Linked
We linked resolution techniques from the literature to the risk factors. We first looked for
resolutions that were linked to specific risks in the literature, and used these linkages when they
were found. When a resolution was listed without explicitly naming the accompanying risk, we
linked to the risk which through intuition we understood the author was referring. Table 12
provides the resolution strategies for each risk area as well as exemplary actions which the
literature recommends as risk resolutions. The numbers in parentheses in the Exemplar Actions
column reference the literature from which each action was derived via reference to Appendix A.
Table 12 – Risk Resolution Strategies and Exemplar Actions

Risk
#

Risk Name

Resolution Strategy

Exemplar Actions

Deliberate codification of the process (149)
Integration manager respects acquiree talent
and assets (130)
Evaluate target technology portfolio with same
tools used to manage acquirer’s systems (123)
Evaluate degree of integration desired
carefully
Involve R&D manager early in planning for
technical acquisitions (123)
Include IS personnel in pre-merger planning
(127)
Consider implications of both companies’
technologies (72)
Evaluate “treasured assets” of target (98)
Provide target with some autonomy (97)
Empower target managers (42)
Be aware of mindset of target ((92)
Operating managers on integration team (92)
Adjust integration process on case-by-case
basis (43)
Insist that consultants have hands on
experience and knowhow (123)
Increase interdependence and connectivity
among employees (82)
Create tasks on which members from both
companies can collaborate(141)
Encourage employees to develop informal ties

Content Risks
1.1

Systems
Compatibility

Analyze and design systems
early

1.2

Integration
Bias

Adopt systematic
evaluation process

1.3

Organizational
Culture

Plan and cultivate
collaboration
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and social relationships (115)
Involve employees in managing process (140)
Develop integration tracking process. (55).
Make overall appointments and other choices
equally, demonstrate integrative equality (47)
Increase autonomy of HR managers (143)
Celebrate small victories (140)
Senior managers actively communicate their
values, beliefs and norms to staff (123)
1.4

National
Culture

Manage national cultural
diversity

Acknowledge differences, adequate
distribution of tasks, mutual respect (17)
Have cultural integration program involving
interaction and working together on projects
(123)
Provide cultural training to staff of both
companies(123)
Assign managers from target to home office
(12)
Recognize that national culture differences
lead to communication failures (71)
Reinforce integrative roles to bridge cultural
gaps (hire consultants or assign task forces)
(136)
Acquirer exerts less formal control, develop
informal control and coordination (32)
Managers’ opinions as to integration process
obtained during process (99)
Conduct cultural audit of target (131)
Senior HR leader and Integration Manager
involved early (131)
Develop strategy before execution of
integration (30)
Develop integration tracking process (55)
Evaluate brand equity decisions as part of
merger process (79)
Retain key employees who maintain customer
relationships (147)
Include customers in the process (20)
Speedy integration of market-related aspects of
merger (68)
Delay post-merger integration until after
product launch (59)
Revise plan and stakeholder expectations (30)
Develop integration tracking process to
include competitor reactions (55)
Use secondary sources (suppliers, customers,
former employees) to evaluate target
technology (72)

Context Risks
2.1

Customer
Relationship

Implement strategies to
maintain marketing
momentum

2.2

Contextual
Ignorance

Engage and inform key
stakeholders
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2.3

Adverse
Behavior

Aggressively manage
employee relations

Communicate purpose of merger and merger
plan early and often (104)
Vary communication and integration strategies
for physically remote employees (41)
Don’t marginalize target employees (5)
Forge social connections between two
companies (13)
Managers tell the truth and have empathy for
employees (118)
Provide certainty by eliminating post-merger
autonomy of target (85)
Choose leaders from both companies (136)
Make decisions quickly and fairly (procedural
justice) (132)
Carefully hire and train integration managers
capable of dealing with conflict (42)
Grant reasonable autonomy to target firm
managers (121)
Integrate people before integrating tasks (22)
Understand differences in ethical attitudes
(Interviewee B)

2.4

External
Stakeholder

Mobilize external
stakeholders

Proactively work with customers and suppliers
(123)
Retain key employees who maintain
relationships (147)
Communications to legitimate merger should
be ongoing process, not one-time event (134)
Build relationships with unions (9)
Avoid long pre-acquisition phase (2)
Proactively initiate contact with regulatory
agencies (Interviewee A)
Prepare “merger intent” document outlining
expectations for the deal and holding people
accountable (11)
Establish new strategic leadership team
immediately (121)
Appointment Integration Manager (11)
Have dedicated merger integration team (25)
Selective participation – not everyone
participates in process directly (95)
Long term strategy communicated to all
organizational members (121)
Maintain integration team well after merger
date (30)
Develop and implement a systemic integration
process (16)
Carefully evaluate combined teams’ ability to
manage pace of change (98)

Process Risks
3.1

Process
Management

Continuously plan and
reorganize process

3.2

Integration
Timing

Monitor and adapt timing
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3.3

Resources
Shortfall

Ensure and monitor
appropriate resources

3.4

Political
Escalation

Implement processes for
conflict resolution

Integrate at proper speed (4)
Exploit negotiation phase to increase
knowledge base and plan integration activities
(43)
Manage employee expectations of pace of
change (11)
Key target employees should have significant
role in integration (111)
Develop standards as to how teams will work
together (98)
Transfer more resources to effort (97)
Plan for maintaining organizational slack (54)
Maintain more resources after integration
(119)
Create mini-integration teams (138)
Bring in additional HR staff to help with
merger process (138)
Embark on projects appropriate for new scale
(14)
Base choices of management on competence
criteria (95)
Predetermine positions during pre-merger
phase (95)
Have resolution mechanisms in place (95)
Manage conflict constructively from very
beginning (98)
Develop short term goals which require entire
team to work together (98)
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EVALUATING CONSTRUCTS
We evaluated the risk and risk resolution lists and our constructs of twelve risk areas and
twelve risk resolutions by interviewing M&A practitioners. Our goal was to determine if the
risks and resolutions detailed by the interviewees without prompting of the risks and resolutions
we had synthesized from the literature would be consistent with our risk and resolution lists and
our categorization of them.
The risks and risk resolutions described in the literature were generally consistent with
those mentioned by the interviewees. Every risk factor we synthesized from the literature was
mentioned unprompted by at least one of the interviewees. And, with few exceptions, all of the
risks the interviewees mentioned were included in the risk factors we derived from the literature.
Table 13 below details the number of risks and risk resolutions mentioned by interviewees.
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Table 13 – Interview Risks and Risk Resolutions Matched to Literature
Risk #

Risks

Resolutions

Systems
Compatibility
Integration
Bias
Organizational
Culture
National Culture

1

2

2

3

3

2

1

0

4

4

3

2

2.3

Customer
Relationship
Contextual
Ignorance
Adverse Behavior

4

4

2.4

External Stakeholder

2

2

3.1

Process Management

3

4

3.2

Integration Timing

3

3

3.3

Resources Shortfall

4

4

3.4

Political Escalation

2

2

2

2

1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
2.1
2.2

Other

Risk Name

The importance of the category adverse behavior was evident in the frequency with
which it was mentioned in the interviews and the literature. The interviewees demonstrated a
concern and empathy for the employees, as when Interviewee A noted “[acquired employees] are
always scared of what you are going to bring them.” Interviewee B offered as a resolution to
Adverse Behavior of acquirer that “you [owners] might want to bonus your guys [management],
because they know you are making a ton of money.”
One risk mentioned by interviewees but which was difficult to categorize in our risk list
from the literature was the risk created by differences in ethics among the participants.
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Interviewee E commented that by being honest and truthful in dealing with employees of the
acquired company “it is amazing what you can accomplish even in a difficult environment.”
Interviewee B described a selling shareholder’s failure to reward key employees of the acquired
company. He identified this as an ethics failure which created risks for the integration of the
companies. We have categorized these two comments in the “Other” category in Table 7. We
would categorize this as an Adverse Behavior Risk on the assumption that these ethical failures
increased the risk that employees would exhibit adverse behavior. It is possible that these
examples from the interviewees could be categorized as differences in organizational culture, but
we felt that Adverse Behavior was the best fit.
One of the exemplar risk resolutions from the literature which we categorized as an
Adverse Behavior resolution was that managers tell the truth and have empathy for employees
(Schweiger, Ivancevich and Power, 1987). This may serve as a risk resolution in this case of
management not being honest or truthful, or if management does not having the empathy to
understand that the owner’s good fortune in selling his company may cause resentment among
employees if it is not shared.
Another risk mentioned by interviewees which was not in the literature was government
regulations or regulatory issues. Interviewee A’s company is highly regulated. Obtaining
government licensing approvals and transfers is a requirement for them to complete any
acquisition. They resolve this issue by keeping an attorney on retainer who alerts them to any
concerns while they are considering a merger, and promptly initiates filings to regulatory
agencies during the merger process. To reflect these interviewee comments, we added the risk
resolution exemplar “Proactively initiate contact with regulatory agencies (Interviewee A)”
under 2.4 Mobilize External Stakeholders in Table 8.
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Neither the interviewees nor the literature provided resolutions for every risk. For
example, Yu, Engleman and Van de Ven (2005) described several risks in an M&A integration
resulting from the diversion of management attention, but did not proscribe a resolution to focus
management’s attention. In many cases the resolutions were implicit, as when Interviewee B
described the risk of an acquirer’s failure to have an integration plan. The resolution was
unstated but clearly it is to have an integration plan.
All of the risks mentioned in the literature were mentioned unprompted by the
interviewees. Only one risk mentioned by the interviewees, the risk of government regulation,
did not appear in our literature review, and we have added it to the risk area External Stakeholder
Risk. All of the resolution areas we derived from the literature were mentioned by the
interviewees except National Culture. Conversely, almost all of the resolutions mentioned by the
interviewees were available in the literature. This evaluation provides some comfort that the
literature review resulted in determining the risks practitioners face in the post-selection phase of
mergers and acquisitions.

DEVELOPING THE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
We developed a risk management framework for M&A by identifying the risks and risk
resolutions inherent in the practice of M&A and in the literature and synthesizing the risks and
risk resolutions into twelve risk factors under three categories. We then linked the risk factors
and risk resolutions, using a risk-action list as developed by Boehm (Boehm, 1991). Next we
developed the framework for use in the risk management process.
VII.I Framework Design
We developed the framework by following Boehm’s outline for the practice of risk
management (Boehm, 1991). Under the first category, risk assessment, one conducts the steps of
risk identification, risk analysis and risk prioritization. The second category, risk control,
involves the steps of risk management planning, risk resolution and risk monitoring. Our
framework will incorporate the first four steps, including the risk management planning process,
where it can then be incorporated into a company’s M&A integration management plan for use
in the ongoing M&A process.
Boehm’s software risk management techniques are suitable for use here, as software
projects have some similarities to the M&A process. The software project risks mentioned by
Boehm all have corresponding risks in the M&A arena. The software project risks Boehm
mentions are the frequency of software-project disasters, the possibility of avoiding those
disasters with early identification and resolution of high-risk items, and the enthusiasm which
carries a project forward despite the failure to attend to the high-risk items. M&A and software
projects also share possible involvement with multiple functional areas of a company, are often
complicated to administer, and are subject to time pressures and limitations. Both mergers and
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large-scale software projects are infrequent events compared to the day-to-day management
activities of a firm.
We used Boehm’s risk-action list, which combines at least one risk resolution action with
each risk factor on the list. We chose it because risk-action lists are considered easier to use and
modify than risk-strategy models (Persson, Mathiassen, Boeg et al., 2009) and provide more
guidance to practitioners than a risk list. Some researchers in the M&A field have followed the
risk-action list approach with a limited scope to identify a small list of risk items and resolution
actions. For example, Cartwright and Cooper (1996) provided a guide to evaluate corporate
cultures and a checklist for use in acquisitions to improve the selection of merger partners and
aid in integration planning.
Because the post-selection phase of M&A transactions often takes place within a very
limited time and is usually a collaborative process with many participants, the ease of employing
a framework is important. The need to employ a framework concurrently by M&A managers
who may come from more than one organization and in several functional areas of an
organization requires the framework be easy to quickly understand. It is also important to be
able to modify a framework to fit an M&A process as it begins, and then to be able to further
adjust and modify it as the process develops. The risk-action list fits the criterion of ease of use
and modification.
There are numerous approaches to developing risk management frameworks, each with
different methods of addressing the elements of risk, resolution and their integration into a
framework. Iversen, Mathiassen and Nielsen (2004) identified four approaches in the field of
software risk management, including generic risk lists, the risk-action list we have chosen, and
two risk-strategy models. We chose not to use the generic risk list because it does not include

59

risk resolutions, which are an important part of the framework. Practitioners in M&A seek to
identify and resolve risks, and the inclusion of risk resolutions in a framework aids in risk
resolution.
Iversen, Mathiassen and Nielsen (2004) also identified two risk-strategy frameworks that
provide increased strategic oversight capabilities. However, they have limitations that may make
them less suitable for the M&A process. The risk-strategy model summarizes numerous
relationships based on a limited number of risk categories and resolution categories. The use of
the risk-strategy model in the context of an M&A process may lead managers to deemphasize
important risks which are part of a risk category that is not emphasized in the selection of a risk
profile. And while the risk-strategy analysis approach may retain the granularity of specific risks
and resolutions so they can be easily addressed, the benefits of building the framework with a
strategic level of analysis may be offset by the added complexity of building the framework.
Following Boehm, we prepared a framework comprised of risk assessment, which
included risk identification, risk analysis, and risk prioritization, as well as risk control, here
comprised of risk-management planning. We designed this framework for the M&A process as
described below:
i)

Risk identification is the first step of risk assessment. During risk

identification, the risks we have previously identified are combined with the risks
identified by the managers for the specific M&A situation. We identified hundreds of
individual risks to the post-selection phase of M&A. Those individual risks were
categorized into twelve risk factors, which we grouped into three areas (Content, Context
and Process) in accordance with Pettigrew’s format (Pettigrew, 1987). We chose the
level of detail provided by the twelve risk factors to allow managers using the framework
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to discuss the relative importance of the twelve risk factors without formally evaluating
all individual risks in the M&A transaction before them.
ii)

The second step is risk analysis, which is an assessment of the likelihood

of each risk factor negatively impacting the merger, and the magnitude of the impact
should it occur. The risk analysis stage is conducted by measuring the risk exposure of
each risk factor. The risk exposure is measured by multiplying the probability each
identified risk will produce an “unsatisfactory outcome” (Boehm, 1991 p. 33) times the
loss if the event associated with the risk occurs. For each risk factor produced in the risk
identification stage, the framework users arrive at two numerical ratings, one for its
probability and one for impact. We used a scale of one to three for these ratings.
iii)

In the risk prioritization stage, participants in an actual M&A situation

rank order the risk factors. Users calculate a risk exposure for each risk factor by
multiplying the likelihood rating times the probability rating for each risk factor. In
addition to the numeric inputs provided independently by project participants, group
discussions are held to confirm, clarify and achieve consensus on the rank ordering. This
step should be done with a number of participants from the management team to
stimulate discussion, provide a thorough analysis of the importance of each risk area in
the context of a particular transaction, and improve support for the conclusions reached
by the group. We chose to calculate risk exposure at the risk factor level. We believe the
twelve risk factors conceptualized in the framework provide an appropriate level of detail
for risk management, avoiding the lack of specificity if risk areas such as context, content
and process were used instead. Persson (2009) chose to use eight risk areas in prioritizing
risk, to avoid the detail of using their 24 risk factors. In Harris (2007), the management
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team undertaking a risk management process found twelve risk constructs appropriate for
use in describing the riskiness of their acquisitions.
iv)

During the risk control stage, managers conduct the fourth step of risk

management, risk management planning. During risk management planning, users
prepare a plan to address the risk factors. The risk exposures calculated in step three and
the risk resolution techniques are used to prepare this plan. Participants use risk
resolution strategies, modified by the participant’s experience and the specific M&A
process, to address each risk and develop a plan for addressing the high priority risks.
The exemplar actions from the literature provide further guidance by detailing possible
actions with which to conduct the resolution strategy. The risk management plans
developed for each of the risks are then integrated with each other and with other ongoing
functions of the merging companies. An example of this integration would be when
contact with customers occurs in the ordinary course of business for the merging
companies. The risk management plan may call for increased contact with customers
concerning the merger. These increased contacts and ordinary contacts may need to be
coordinated to ensure customers receive a consistent message and that it is presented with
the desired frequency and style. Finally, the risk management plan is integrated with the
overall process guiding the implementation of the merger.

62

Table 14 is an example of a risk assessment template which could be provided to
managers in a merger to evaluate the relative levels of risk faced in a particular situation.
Table 14 – Risk Assessment Template

Risk
Name

1.1

Systems
Compatibility

Risk
Definition

Merging firms have practices,
systems, reward systems or
operating policies which are so
incompatible integration
problems are created.

1.2 Integration Bias Integration decisions are
dominated by one party or by
limited business, technical or
functional areas.
1.3 Organizational
Culture

1.4 National
Culture

2.1 Customer
Relationships

Risk Level

Risk Impact

L

M H

L

M H

__

__

__

__

__

__

Risk
Exposure

_____

___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _____

Merger process or integration
is hampered or resisted due to
differences in corporate
cultures.

___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _____

Merger process or integration
is negatively impacted by
differences in nationalities,
language or culture.

___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _____

Customer relationships are
negatively impacted by the
merger.

___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _____
2.2 Contextual
Ignorance

2.3

Adverse
Behavior

2.4 External
Stakeholder

Contexts outside the company
are not adequately understood
or are insufficiently attended to
during the merger process.
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _____
Employee behavior due to the
merger process negatively
impacts company performance
during and after the merger
___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _____
process.
Outside stakeholders do not
support, understand or
collaborate with the process.

___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _____
3.1 Process

Inadequate management action
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Management

3.2 Integration
Timing

or leadership of the merger
process leads to a significant
departure from merger goals.

___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _____

Timeliness of the planning for
and implementation of the
integration is inadequate.

___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _____
3.3 Resources
Shortfall

3.4 Political
Escalation

There is insufficient slack,
resources or skills to properly
prosecute the integration
program or realize expected
benefits of the merger
Political struggles over which
company’s management
systems to use

___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _____

___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ _____
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Figure 1 below outlines the framework.
Figure 1 – Risk Management Framework
Identify Risks
M&A Team Members
use framework risk list
and add risks applicable
for that project.

Analyze Risks
Evaluate probability and
impact of each risk area
for this acquisition

Prioritize Risk
Rank order risks based
on analysis of risks.

Risk Management
Planning
Develop plan to address
risks for incorporation in
risk management plan
and/or M&A planning.

EVALUATING FRAMEWORK

We then utilized published case studies to evaluate the framework for its risk
identification and risk management planning potential. We evaluated the thoroughness and
potential usefulness of the framework by comparing the four cases to the framework. While we
did not have the benefit of interviewing the managers involved in the cases, we conducted an
examination of the cases to evaluate a hypothetical use of the framework.
VIII.I Risk Identification
We found that in the cases the risks identifiable from the cases had been identified in the
literature. We did find some of the risk areas identified from the literature were not identifiable
in the cases. Table 15 below tabulates the risks and risk resolutions found in the four cases.
Appendix C provides details concerning the risks and risk resolutions identified in each case.
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Table 15 – Tabulation of Case Mentions of Risk and Risk Resolutions
Each risk and risk resolution we identified in a case is marked with a checkmark.
Risk Area
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4

Systems Compatibility

Risks
RR
Integration Bias
Risks
RR
Organizational Culture Risks
RR
National Culture
Risks
Bias
RR
Customer Relationship Risks
RR
Contextual Ignorance Risks
RR
Adverse Behavior
Risks
RR
External Stakeholder
Risks
RR
Process Management Risks
RR
Integration Timing
Risks
RR
Resources Shortfall
Risks
RR
Political Escalation
Risks
RR

Bombardier Deloitte Dow

Unity








































































The process management risk area arises from inadequate management action or
leadership of the merger process. This concern was present in all four cases. For example, in the
Dow case the managers identified process management risks from the IT integration process,
entering a new product line and ad hoc management of the acquisition process.
External stakeholder risks were identified only in the Bombardier case. External
stakeholder risk is defined as a situation where outside stakeholders do not support or understand
the merger process. The risks presented by the need for Bombardier to obtain European
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Commission (EC) approval of the transaction were highlighted. The risks were: 1) the EC would
not approve the transaction, since management perceived the EC was biased against a U.S.
company buying a European business, and 2) the limited access Bombardier was allowed to
Adtranz prior to approval, which impeded efforts to plan the integration.
The risks posed by national culture were not identified as such in any of the cases,
despite three of the four acquisitions involving companies with headquarters or substantial
operations in two different countries. This may be because, in the case of the cross-border
acquisitions, the acquirer and acquiree both operated in numerous countries before the
acquisition, and sometimes both companies had operations in the country or continent where the
acquiree was located. For example, in the Unity case, South Africa-based Unity had operations
in the United States prior to its proposed acquisition of Delta, which operated only in the United
States. Managers at Unity framed their employee-related integration issues in terms of process or
context issues, less often as content issues, and not national culture issues. For example, one
employee-related integration issue for Unity concerned how to evaluate good IT professionals
and dismiss others from the combined operations in the rushed environment dictated by the
merger process. This was framed as a process management risk, not a cultural risk. Similarly,
when confronted with the decision as to which side to pick to run the new organization, and their
concerns about the possible employee gamesmanship which might result from those decisions,
management did not point to cultural differences as an issue. Instead, the risk was framed in
terms of context risks, primarily adverse behavior. Management’s concerns were with possible
negative reactions inherent in the context of the merger as certain groups or people were chosen
over others, but these were not framed as national or organizational culture clashes.
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Risks of political escalation were only mentioned in the Unity case, where it was
characterized as benign compared to most of the exemplars from the literature. For example, we
found the term “sabotaged by cliques” in the literature as an exemplar of political escalation, but
in the Unity case, the political escalation took the form of the Delta staff approaching the
integration manager to seek retention of two systems which provided productivity tools for
business users. So the description of political escalation provided to management users of the
framework should emphasize the range of situations encompassed by this risk area, not only the
extreme cases.
VIII.II Risk Management Planning
In risk management planning, management develops a plan to address the risks they have
previously analyzed and prioritized. The framework provides resolution strategies for each risk
area as well as exemplary actions from the literature which help explain the strategies. We
evaluated the risk management guidance provided by the framework in a similar manner as
Alaranta and Mathiassen (2011) by comparing the strategies employed by the managers in case
studies with those in the framework. We found that most of the resolution strategies in the
framework were considered for use by managers in the cases. We did not find any strategies
suggested in the cases which were not available in the framework.
We evaluated the potential effectiveness of the risk resolution strategies in the framework
by reviewing the cases to determine if the proposed risk resolution strategies were applicable.
VIII.II.i Content risks.
1.1

For systems compatibility issues, the resolution strategy is to analyze and design

systems early. Systems compatibility issues in the Bombardier case were discovered early in the
M&A process by the senior management team at Bombardier. They recognized that these issues
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required them to proceed immediately with planning for the merged systems, including
evaluating what degree of integration was desired.
1.2

Integration bias issues arose in all four cases, as did risk resolution strategies for

them. In the Dow case the framework’s suggested resolution strategy of adopting a systematic
evaluation process was used to counter two identified integration bias risks. The first risk was
that Dow would “overpower” the acquiree Wolff and lose a “diamond in the rough.” The second
risk was that an emphasis on the speed of integration at Dow would overwhelm other
considerations. Dow management discussed several of the exemplar actions listed in the
framework to counter these risks, including adjusting the integration process on a case-by-case
basis, evaluating the “treasured assets” of the target, and being aware of the mindset of the target.
For example, Dow considered delaying the realization of annual cost savings which would come
from integration of Dow’s global IT systems into Wolff to avoid disturbing Wolff’s “leading
edge automated manufacturing process.”
After adopting a systematic evaluation process, Deloitte attempted to resolve integration
bias risks using several exemplar actions. They considered implications of both companies’
technologies by involving key people from both Deloitte and Andersen on the integration teams
and encouraging the identification and implementation of best practices regardless of their
source.
1.3

The resolution strategy for organizational culture issues is to plan and motivate

collaboration. This strategy was utilized in the Deloitte case, by combining people from both
organizations at on offsite location, having the integration team pay particular attention to the
organizational culture differences, and relying on victories in the marketplace to bring the two
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groups together. These specific actions are all suggested in the exemplar actions for dealing with
organizational culture issues.
1.4

National culture risks were not identified in the cases.

VIII.II.ii Context risks.
2.1

Customer relationship risks

Customer relationship risks call for managers to implement strategies to maintain
marketing momentum, including retaining key employees with customer relationships, involving
customers in the process, and quickly integrating market-related aspects of the merger. In the
Unity case, customer relationships presented several risks due to the critical and time-sensitive
role Delta’s services played in their customer’s operations. The risk resolution in the framework
calls for management to implement strategies to maintain marketing momentum. Unity did that
by considering taking advantage of Delta’s superior knowledge of its own systems by allowing
Delta to lead the integration. Unity also weighed delaying the integration until after an important,
previously scheduled task for a large Delta client had been finished.
2.2

Contextual ignorance risk

Contextual ignorance, which occurs when contexts outside the company are not well
understood or are insufficiently attended to during integration, may be remedied by engaging
and informing key stakeholders. In the Dow case, contextual ignorance took the form of an
initial lack of understanding of the potential impact of German holiday schedules on the best
timing for the integration. It was also represented by Dow’s initial failure to realize that Wolff
had a stand-alone business services unit which provided service to other companies, but which
did not fit in Dow’s business model. Dow engaged and informed by considering adjusting the
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integration schedule until after the scheduled German vacations, and considering numerous
alternatives to quickly shutting down the business services unit.
2.3

Adverse behavior risk

Adverse behavior risk, the risk of employee behavior negatively impacting company
performance, calls for managers to aggressively manage employee relations. This was a concern
in all four cases, and management considered resolution strategies in all cases. Unity considered
countering gamesmanship, resistance to change and potentially demoralized staff by leaving
some of Delta’s systems intact, creating integration departments from both companies, and
announcing which systems will be terminated promptly. Deloitte sought to fight “rumors that
fed anxiety among people in both organizations” by finding common ground and encouraging
employees to become invested in the process.
2.4

External stakeholder risk

External stakeholder risk, the risk that outside stakeholders do not support, understand or
collaborate with the process, was identified only in the Bombardier case. Bombardier negotiated
with the outside stakeholder, the EC, by proactively working with them and resolving issues as
quickly as possible.
VIII.II.iii Process risks.
3.1

Process management risk

Process management risks and risk resolutions were identified in all four cases. The risk
resolution strategy for this risk is to continuously plan and reorganize process. Deloitte did this
by “monitoring the integration process through a monthly survey” which allowed them to “take
remedial action if… the integration goals were not obtained.” This survey was also used as the
basis for a monthly conference call to “share updates and ideas.” Thus Deloitte utilized
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exemplar actions identified in the literature by having a dedicated merger integration team and
developing a systematic integration process.
In the Dow case, Dow had developed a very detailed integration methodology for its
many acquisitions, and implemented this methodology via a planning center they called the
Program Management Office. Through this office, Dow used exemplar actions such as preparing
a “merger intent” document and having a dedicated integration team with selective participation.
3.2

Integration Timing

The framework suggests that managers seeking to resolve integration timing risks should
monitor and adapt timing. Unity faced a large processing task for an important Delta client. This
led Unity to consider speeding up systems conversion before the event or postpone it, in line
with exemplar actions which suggest “integrate at proper speed” and “carefully evaluate …
ability to manage pace of change.” Unity’s concern over the risk of possible disruption to the
companies if the integration of the infrastructure was done too soon led them choose to sacrifice
some potential cost savings to avoid the disruption, another example of monitoring and adapting
their timing.
3.3

Resources shortfall

Some mergers are at risk of a resources shortfall, when there are insufficient resources or
skills to properly manage the integration process. Deloitte was concerned that taking people
offsite during the integration process would impact billable hours. Their solution, which was in
line with the framework’s resolution strategy to ensure and monitor appropriate resources, was
to form a national integration team to lead the integration and reduce the required involvement of
other company personnel.
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3.4

Political escalation

Political struggles over which company’s management systems to use, or political
escalation, was a concern in the Unity case. Unity’s proposed solution was to implement
processes for conflict resolution by creating integration departments with resources from both
companies to determine which systems should continue in use. Thus Unity could have looked to
the framework’s exemplar actions for guidance, including having resolution mechanisms in place
and managing conflict constructively from very beginning.
VIII.III Conclusion
By applying the framework in selected case studies, we were able to better understand the
risk identification potential and risk management applicability of the framework in the M&A
process. We found that the overlap of the cases with the framework was substantial, as indicated
in detail in Table 15 and in summary in Table 16 below. As a further check on the possible
applicability of the framework, we applied the risk prioritization step to the Unity Case.
Appendix E shows the results of that exercise. We found that even without the advantages of a
dialogue with managers undergoing a merger, the case study was able to provide clues which
allowed us to estimate the severity and likelihood of various risk areas as they might appear to a
management team. Subject to its use by practitioners involved in or reflecting on an actual
M&A process, we believe applying the case studies indicates that the framework can be a useful
risk management tool for practitioners.
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Table 16 Overlap of Cases and Framework
Found in cases, available in

Available in framework, found

framework

in cases

Risk Identification

All

All except National Culture

Risk Management Planning

All

All except National Culture

DISCUSSION

After decades of practice and research, the value of corporate mergers and acquisitions to
the acquiring company is still very much in doubt. The management of the risks inherent in the
merger process may account for some of the problems in M&A performance. Methods of
counteracting or mitigating some of the problems or risks in the merger process are presented in
the literature. These include lists with recommended steps to effect a successful merger and
detailed due diligence checklists developed by practitioners and researchers (Hubbard, 2001;
Rosenbloom, 2002). Our research builds on previous research by listing and classifying the risks
and risk resolutions in the post-selection stage of M&A, and linking the risks and risk resolution
techniques in a risk management framework.
The extensive literature investigating the problems presented by mergers does not supply
a comprehensive list of risks and risk resolutions, nor does it provide a framework for managing
risks in the post-selection phase of M&A transactions. Our research provides a list of risks and
risk resolutions derived from the literature, synthesized for easier use and understanding and
refined by interviews with practitioners. We evaluated the resulting framework using previously
published case studies. Our research follows in the path of research into the risk management
process (Boehm, 1991), risk management within the MIS function of the M&A environment
(Alaranta and Mathiassen, 2011), assisting managers in assessing the risk profile of an
acquisition (Harris, 2007), and recognizing the importance of the integration process for the
success of M&As (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).
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IX.I Practitioners
Haleblian, Devers, McNamara et al. (2009) noted that scholarly insights in M&A did not
seem to be helping practitioners improve their M&A results. They ask if these insights are not
being transferred to practitioners, or if they are “impractical or unfeasible to execute” (p. 485).
The risk management framework provided by this research is designed to be usable by
practitioners in the hope it can facilitate the transfer of knowledge to practitioners.
Based in part on our experience in M&A practice, we reviewed the literature and have
distilled the prior knowledge into a new form which is more accessible to other practitioners.
Our work can serve as the basis for further use, analysis and refinement by practitioners and
scholars. For example, our research could be used by practitioners by using a web-based
software interface. The risk and risk resolution factors we have synthesized could be presented
to managers using the interface. When a manager identified a risk area of interest, the research
from which that risk was derived could be presented for further analysis and application. This
software interface could enable our research to increase access to the detail in the literature at the
time it is most needed, and may increase the transfer of knowledge. This software interface
could also be used to facilitate collaboration among managers undergoing an M&A process.
This research can also serve as the basis for practitioner-oriented articles which distill the
research into a more accessible, usable form for practitioners. Included in these articles could be
the form for evaluating risk factors from Table 14 for application by practitioners.
A risk assessment for a particular merger could be conducted by interviewing managers
while they are involved in the merger. Managers could be asked to confirm that the risk-action
lists are viable and list the risks they encounter, and to evaluate the risk probability and impact
for each factor. From their evaluations, the framework can be changed to improve ease of use
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and the practicality of the risk-action list for a particular acquisition or industry. This type of
approach was used by Persson, Mathiassen, Boeg et al. (2009) to develop a risk management
framework for use in distributed software projects.
Our risk management framework may be useful in guiding practitioners in the
management of M&A transactions. It may prove useful for management teams to explicate the
risks perceived by various managers within a company to encourage agreement or understanding
of the risks presented by a pending merger.
Researchers working with practitioners could utilize the framework to evaluate its
usefulness in relation to current company practices in an active M&A process or retrospectively
to review a company’s M&A experience. Mohrman, Gibson and Mohrman (2001) found that
practitioners viewed research as more useful when it was applied collaboratively with
researchers to address company problems. A joint interpretation of results with practitioners may
increase the knowledge transfer of this research to practice.
Serial acquirers may increase their likelihood for successful merger outcomes based on
the learning and expertise they acquire (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). It is possible that part
of that increased success rate is due to identifying and mitigating the risk factors inherent in
acquisitions. This research produced a framework which may assist managers in helping them
document and apply that learning for their organizations for future acquisitions. Although we
believe that the framework would be of assistance to managers, we have not been able to validate
that it would enable them to achieve different M&A outcomes.
Practitioners may benefit by the implementation of risk lists proposed in our framework. The
benefits of implementing checklists for software practitioners are discussed in Keil, Li,
Mathiassen, and Zheng (2008), who found that the use of checklists helped the practitioners
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identify more risks than when no checklist was used. They also found that managers changed
their behavior when certain types of risk were identified, but that the total number of risks
identified did not influence behavior. Our framework could be used to identify the key risks
which influence the behavior of managers during the M&A process, and provoke further
investigation into those particular risks.
IX.II Contributions/Future Research
The importance of the risk factors and viability of the risk resolutions identified here, and
their impact on M&A transactions, could be explored using similar methods as in Wallace and
Keil (2004). As was done by Wallace and Keil with software project managers, M&A managers
from numerous companies could be surveyed to indicate which risks were present in recent
transactions they managed. They could then evaluate the success of the M&A process, including
its completion versus the schedule, achieving other short and long term goals, and their success
in managing the risks. We might then be able to better understand which risks impact merger
success, how well the resolutions are utilized, and evaluate the success of the application of those
risk resolutions.
Management behavior when a risk management framework is included in the M&A
process could be compared to behavior without the use of these risk management techniques.
These behaviors could include both the identification of risks, their use of risk resolution
techniques, and their ex post evaluation of the efficacy of their actions.
The risk management framework may serve as a basis for further research seeking to
explain M&A process issues and M&A outcomes. For example, researchers could review
completed acquisitions to determine the degree to which the risk management framework was
implemented, and evaluate the effect on M&A outcomes from using the framework.

79

Researchers could compare M&A performance to the riskiness of the process. The risk of
the process could be determined using the framework to measure managers’ level of perceived
risk in their particular M&A transactions. This risk could be compared to the performance of the
mergers using the traditional measures of performance such as CARs, operating performance or
management evaluation.
Researchers might also be used to determine which risk factors most threaten M&A
performance. Management’s use of risk resolution techniques or other responses to the perceived
risk could also be evaluated to determine if risk factors are best resolved using particular risk
resolution techniques. For example, when organizational culture differences are perceived to be
an important risk, which of the resolutions suggested by the literature lead to effective
resolution? Under what circumstances does one work and not the other?
Some of the lessons learned in the M&A arena may prove helpful in evaluating risks in
strategic alliances, joint ventures and other situations, such as some private-equity backed
acquisitions. However, the focus of this dissertation is on M&As which involve a change of
ownership control and which require some degree of integration of the two operating entities.
For additional evaluation of the framework, several interviews could be conducted with
members of the same merger team within an organization, as was done by Harris (2007). Even
more preferable would be the use of the framework during the course of an actual project, as was
done by Iversen (2004).
The framework may benefit from use and iterations with practitioners while they are in
the process of managing the M&A process. It may prove beneficial to alter the framework to suit
the M&A practices and issues of specific industries.
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Although our search of peer-reviewed articles was extensive, there may be additional
relevant research, either in the non-academic literature, or references published prior to 1992,
which would contribute to our understanding of the risks and risk resolutions in M&A.
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Appendix B: Detailed Comments from Cases
1.

Unity Case

Risk# Risk Faced

Description of Problem

1.1

Systems
Compatibility

1.2

Integration
Bias

Integration problems would be
created by adding a consolidation
of the Unity and Delta systems.
Unity’s systems already had
substantial weaknesses, and Delta
had not consolidated its own
systems, presumably because of the
cost, difficulty and potential impact
on customers such a consolidation
would have entailed
New organizational structure
needed for combined companies.
Some felt Unity staff should take
over since they were the acquirer

2.1

Customer
Relationships

2.1

Customer
Relationships

2.1

Customer
Relationship

2.3

Adverse
Behavior

2.3

Adverse
Behavior

2.3

Adverse
Behavior

Unity did not want customers to
leave Delta because of its new
management
Large processing task for one of
Delta’s biggest clients scheduled to
occur in three months
A specific requirement for a client
was not well documented, if not
delivered client might be lost

Delta staff members already
resisting change due to Delta
systems possibly being retired
Gamesmanship if picked either side
to run the new organizational
structure

Some staff members will be
demoralized by the increased
uncertainty brought about by
change

Resolution
Strategy
Per
Framework

Description of
Resolution Strategy
Considered or
Utilized in Case

Adopt
systematic
evaluation
process

Considered creating
integration
departments drawing
upon resources from
both companies.

Implement
strategies to
maintain
marketing
momentum
Aggressively
manage e/e
relations
Aggressively
manage
employee
relations

Allow Delta to lead
the integration since
Delta knows their
systems best.

Aggressively
manage
employee
relations

Back down from
terminating some
Delta systems?
Considered creating
integration
departments drawing
upon resources from
both companies.
Be candid and
announce which
systems will be
terminated, or delay
announcement until
last possible moment
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3.1

Process
Management

Largest acquisition Unity had done.

3.1

Process
Management

3.2

Integration
Timing
Integration
Timing

Evaluating good IT pros and letting
others go difficult in rushed
environment dictated by merger
process
Work can’t begin due to legal and
regulatory hurdles
Large processing task for one of
Delta’s biggest clients scheduled to
occur in three months
Disruption if infrastructure (phones,
networking hardware) done too
soon

3.2

3.2

Integration
Timing

3.3

Resources
Shortfall

Large acquisition would be most
demanding that Unity had done

3.4

Political
Escalation

Political struggles over which
company’s management systems to
use

Continuously
plan and
reorganize
process

Dedicated Integration
team appointed at
Unity with
experienced members
from offices around
the world
None proposed

Speed up conversion
before event?
Monitor and
adapt timing

Implement
processes for
conflict
resolution

Run two systems for a
while to avoid
disrupting clients vs.
cost savings expected
from consolidating
soon.
Create effective plan
to cover all
requirements.
Specifically,
integration plan must
considers and
prioritizes four critical
factors software,
infrastructure,
organizational
structure and people.
Considered creating
integration
departments drawing
upon resources from
both companies.
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2.

Dow Case

Risk# Risk Faced

Description of Problem

Resolution
Strategy
Per
Framework
Adopt
systematic
evaluation
process
Adopt
systematic
evaluation
process
Implement
strategies to
maintain
marketing
momentum

Description of
Resolution Strategy
Considered or
Utilized in Case
Recognized that Dow could
learn from Wolff’s high level
of automation and transfer this
to other business units.
Adjust integration process on
a case-by-case basis

Engage and
inform key
stakeholders.

Dow needed to find a
completely new IT system for
this unit, which would cost $2
million.

Integration
Bias

If we overpower acquiree
[Wolff] we may discard a
diamond in the rough

1.2

Integration
Bias

To some people at Dow,
speed of integration meant
everything.

2.1

Customer
Relationships

Dow entering specialty
chemicals business with
new types of customers

2.2

Contextual
Ignorance

2.2

Contextual
Ignorance

2.3

Adverse
Behavior

Germans consider their
summer holiday sacrosanct,
this might delay integration
timing.
Wolff had a business
services unit which
provided services to outside
companies, as well as to
Wolff, using a business
model which was foreign to
Dow. Dow did not know
about this unit before
making the purchase.
Gaps between each other’s
way of working. Wolff’s
staff working against
instead of with acquirer
staff.

3.1

Process
Management

IT integration process
concerns

Continuously
plan and
reorganize
process

Process
Management

Management of the
acquisition process was ad

Continuously
plan and

1.2

3.1

Consider what strategy (fast
or slower integration) would
be most effective. Integrate
customer-facing activities at a
slower pace or not integrate
them at all
Proposed launching none of
the integration projects until
October.

Created a “chill period”
during which companies bring
issues to the table, jointly
work on them and make sure
you don’t miss any. Through
intensive interaction, got the
Wolff staff to cooperate.
Integration speed is key, and
is better achieved through
implementation steering
committee, joint planning
sessions with both sides,
setting key milestones, have
Day One checklist and devise
performance metrics
Developed a standard
methodology for managing
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hoc
3.1

3.2

Process
Management

Entering new product line
so risk in integration
approach chosen

Integration
Timing

Three month extension of
the integration requested.
Dow upper management
resisted effort to delay
integration due to delay in
realizing cost synergies.

reorganize
process
Continuously
plan and
reorganize
process

Integrate at
proper speed

the due diligence and
implementation stages
Determine how fast and fully
to integrate passed on
strategic rationale for the
merger. Provided time for
input from all acquirer
functional and business
leaders before integration
planning complete
Delay integration to allow
time due to summer vacation
and concerns about
implementing without
adequate planning.
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3.

Bombardier Case

Risk# Risk Faced

Description of Problem

Resolution
Strategy
Per
Framework

Description of
Resolution Strategy
Considered or
Utilized in Case

Analyze and
design systems
early

Integration planning
begun while still awaiting
regulatory approval
Integration planning
begun while still awaiting
regulatory approval
BBD tried to eliminate
waste ... by applying …
management approaches
over time as opposed to
pushing to replace
existing methods.
Transfers were not all one
way, aerospace also
shared its best practices
with engineering.

1.1

Systems
Compatibility

Certain management practices
need adjustment.

1.1

Systems
Compatibility

1.2

Integration
Bias

Fundamentally incompatible
organizational structures must
be reconciled.
How quickly to integrate and
what existing approaches to
replace?

1.3

Organizational
Culture

1.3

Organizational
Culture

2.1

Customer
Relationships

2.1

Customer
Relationships

2.3

Adverse
Behavior

“I don’t think Adtranz has had
enough time to develop its own
culture. Every two years there
seems to have been a change of
ownership, a change in
structure, a change in values,
and a change in processes. So
under the circumstances you
don’t get a good sense of who
you are.”
Need to get management
focused on the
operations…avoid finger
pointing at former Adtranz
management and create a
climate conductive to teamwork.
Should we focus our planning
on ways to improve the product
quality and reliability of
Adtranz equipment with
existing customers?
Cost cutting could hurt market
performance of company.
The management team would be
demoralized if Bombardier was
invited in only to later walk

Adopt
systematic
evaluation
process

Implement
strategies to
maintain
marketing
momentum
Ensure a balance
between cost reduction …
and revenue growth.
Negotiated a delayed
payment to be made after
Bombardier had a chance
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away from the transaction.
How to transform businesses
into market leaders?

2.3

Adverse
Behavior

2.3

Adverse
Behavior

2.3

Adverse
Behavior

2.4

External
Stakeholder

2.4

External
Stakeholder

EC might have a bias against
North American companies.

3.1

Process
Management

Do we sit and wait for approval
from the EC before taking steps
toward integration?

3.1

Process
Management

Have to make sure people are
focusing on key factors and
what needs to get done.

3.2

Integration
Timing

3.2

Integration
Timing

BBD had a reputation for being
patient in the integration of the
acquired company.
Should we start to institute
personnel changes within BT in
anticipation of the merger, and
if so at what pace?

Need to streamline costs
difficult to do quickly in a large
acquisition.
Need to minimize tensions and
maximize teamwork with
personnel changes imminently
on the horizon?
EC approval process limits preclosing due diligence and
interaction between firms.

Adopt
systematic
evaluation
process

Mobilize
external
shareholders

Continuously
plan and
reorganize
process
Continuously
plan and
reorganize
process
Integrate at
proper speed
Integrate at
proper speed

to do more due diligence.
… good relationships
with existing personnel
and development of pride
within those on the team.
Focus first on creating a
healthy operating
environment.

Negotiation strategy with
EC to id critical issues in
advance and minimize
disagreements.
Tried to shape focus of
EC on European market
in total, make concessions
to EC.

You should never forget
that people like successes
and being on the winning
team.
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4.

Deloitte Case

Risk# Risk Faced

1.2

Integration
Bias

1.3

Organizational
Culture

2.1

Customer
Relationships

2.2

Contextual
Ignorance

2.3

Adverse
Behavior

Description of Problem

“There was an attitude
among some employees
within Deloitte … that
people coming from
Andersen were damaged
goods and that these people
should be grateful that they
had found a good home.”
“…the Andersen people
would be blamed if the
combined organization
missed the financial
targets…. Such scapegoating
would detract from the
integration efforts.”
“The cultural issues were
showing up in day to day
behavior.”
“Cultures do not change that
quickly.”
“We don’t want to lose
people because of poor
interpersonal treatment.”
“People were constantly onsite at the client’s business.”

“… our goal is to make this
transition absolutely
seamless for our clients…”
“Of course, we want to be
able to retain all our clients.”
“Strict limitations on contact
between Deloitte and
Andersen to permit
regulatory review.”
“Numerous rumors that feed
anxiety among people in
both organizations…”
“The Andersen people
probably have a fear that

Resolution
Strategy
Per
Framework
Adopt
systematic
evaluation
process.

Description of
Resolution Strategy
Considered or
Utilized in Case
“Equal numbers of Deloitte
and Andersen personnel
were represented on the
team. An effort was made to
ensure that key people from
both sides were involved, in
order to guide the
integration challenge.”
“Best practices were
identified, and integrating
officers were encouraged to
implement these practices
across offices.”
“The actual successes
achieved in the marketplace
would hold the combined
entities together.”
The national integration
team paid special attention
to cultural gaps between
members of the two
organizations.
“… taking the people from
the two organizations to an
offsite location to deal with
the issues of cultural
differences…”

Implement
strategies to
maintain
marketing
momentum
Engage and
inform key
stakeholders.
Aggressively
manage
employee
relations.

“… we have to find
common ground.”
“…individuals would see (or
feel in their pocket) that
investing significant
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3.1

Process
Management

3.2

Integration
Timing

3.2

Integration
Timing

3.3

Resources
Shortfall

they will be taken over and
their identity and sense of
value will be lost.”
“There is often a strong
tendency on the part of those
leading the change efforts to
declare victory too soon.”

Some Deloitte employees
feared that Deloitte
management in its haste to
consummate this new deal
and welcome Andersen, was
forgetting about its own
employees.
“… a lengthy process
increased the risk that a
major client and a significant
number of talented
professionals would be lost.”
Taking people offsite to deal
with interpersonal issues
would affect billable hours.

resources in the
transaction… was worth it.”
Continuously
plan and
reorganize
process

“Deloitte monitored the
integration process through
a monthly survey which
would allow the team to
benchmark unit to unit over
time, and to take remedial
action if, at specific stages,
the integration goals were
not attained.”
“Once every two weeks, the
managing partners of each
of the five Deloitte offices
would convene for a
conference call to share
updates and ideas, some of
which resulted from the …
survey.”

Integrate at
proper speed

Integrate at
proper speed

“Because both sides moved
rapidly, the entire process
was completed in six
weeks.”

Ensure and
monitor
appropriate
resources

“A national integrations
team consisting of 12
individuals was formed to
lead the integration.”

97

Appendix C: Detailed Comments from Interviewees

1.1 System
Compatibility

1.2 Integration
Bias

1.3
Organizational
Culture

Risks

Resolutions

A: If we do a larger acquisition our
main challenge is the IT department.
That is one of the risks if we were to
do too many [acquisitions] too
quickly.
A: The challenge is …the company
we acquire…may take two months to
close their books as opposed to 5 or
15 days.
A: concerned about their system
going down, not working.
C: So they closed the transaction in
February, [CEO] was let go in April,
[CFO] let go in May. Throughout
that time, I don’t believe that
anybody from acquirer came to our
[acquiree] office.
.

D: Have functional areas talking [early].
A: IT will be putting in the network so they
can share info with us immediately [after the
merger].

D: Can we get the rank and file to
concentrate on the positives and not
the negatives?
C: No communication, no human
compassion [from acquirer as it fired
employees].
C: The big risk that I have seen,
…it’s the people, the culture, and
how do they fit.
B: Boards bring in [managers] from a
company with a culture of
infrastructure. They know how to
work within the system, but not how
to create it.

D: Rank them [management] into A & B
players, evaluate them over time, spend time
to identify weaknesses. It’s situational, but be
overly communicative about what you intend
to do.
D: Be fair to those who are departing and help
with the outsourcing.
D: … if you’ve got to pick a side, pick a side.
A: Our biggest savings is in HR, getting them
on the same health care…property
casualty,..payroll…401k.
A: Within a month we will have them on our
mainframe, our network, so they will be
billing out of our system.
A: We then let them [acquiree management]
manage their people to build their budgets, try
to achieve what we feel they are capable of
achieving.
A: In acquisitions we do not use outside
consulting because… we feel we have a very
good understanding of what the business is
worth.
E: You have to have buyin from both sides.
D: Planning and participation.
D: Spending the time to understand
[organizational cultures] made us much more
enthusiastic about that transaction.
D: Merger committee has got to have both
sides on it.
D: Sometimes only one culture will work. If
that is the case, communicate it. If you’ve got
to pick a side, pick a side.
B: It is impossible to overcommunicate.
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1.4 National
Culture

2.1 Customer
Relationships

D: They didn’t do a good job of
connecting with the [other country’s]
management.
D: There was not an effort to make
the connection between the future
business owners. It caused suspicion
and mistrust.
D: Don’t lose the top five customers.
C: We were very careful about how
we handled customer relationships.
E: People [customers] want to make
sure nothing is going to change.

2.2 Contextual
Ignorance

A: What we pay most attention to is
to make sure that the [suppliers]
can’t move.
C: The first real risk was
negotiating… patents. [Three large
competitors] held all the patents.
E: That [supplier relationships] can
sometimes be a sticking issue

2.3 Adverse
Behavior

D: People wonder what’s up what is
my role going forward?
D: Do they [acquirer] share my
vision or are they going to take me
out? It caused suspicion and
mistrust.
D: The biggest risk is losing your
best performers. You are going to be
left with the guys nobody wanted.
A: …they [acquired employees] are
always scared of what you are going
to bring them.
C: I got an email … that a female
staffer [at acquired company] was

D: It’s pretty easy to send out a letter to every
single customer saying, here is the situation.
D: Hopefully put a positive spin on it, if there
is one.
A: We give them (customers) letters to let
them know there is an acquisition. They
legally have the right to…opt out, and at that
point in time we would have to decide if we
wanted to go through with the acquisition, if
they are large enough to affect the acquisition.
C: We were very focused on getting out to the
big customers after we announced a deal, very
quickly. We’d go to see the CEO [of
customers] personally, just in an effort to say
everything’s fine. That helped a great deal.
E: Explain [to customers] that nothing is
going to change, but on the upside there are
more resources available to you.
A: We have an attorney to deal with the
regulations of that state.
A: We are conservative and don’t force the
issue, if something [an acquisition] is not
going to work you don’t do it.
(1993)

D: Employee communications
D: Don’t mess with people’s benefits.
D: Position the message ..in a way that
achieves your corporate objectives.
D: Talk about benefits, talk about 401k.
D: Communicate a clear compensation
program going forward for those who are
staying.
D: You can always have direct conversations
with those who are your best performers and
bring them to be inside of a team and tell
them you’ve been identified to stay.
A: The key is just getting the seller’s
management to buy off on your program
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being sexually harassed.
C: He [the seller] got a card from [an
employee of the seller] thanking me
for nothing. [Employees had
previously complained they were
underpaid while owner sold company
for a lot of money.
C: [Failure to] keep the intellectual
history [people]…as soon as you
walk from that you have a real
problem.

before they close the deal so they know what
to expect.
C: …fly out [immediately] to have a
conversation with her [alleged sexual
harassee].
B: Might want to bonus your guys, because
they know you are making a ton of money.
E: The thing you cannot get wrong is messing
with people’s pay or benefits.
BG: …if you can convince people in the
company that you are going to be honest and
truthful, and you actually demonstrate that
with your actions, not just your words, its
amazing what you can accomplish even in a
difficult environment.
B: It is impossible to overcommunicate.

2.4 External
Stakeholders

A: Our main risk in our industry is
with our suppliers.
C: Debt holder might object to the
sale of the company

3.1 Process
Management

D: Lack of proper, comprehensive,
well thought out planning.
D: If you don’t have those
conversations those first three
months [post-acquisition] they
assume you are not watching.
A: …the risks…are going to be
workman’s comp claims, your health
insurance claims and so forth.
B: We weren’t really sure what we
bought
B: Their efforts to integrate our
business were next to nil. The guy
who was supposed to merge the
business was in exactly one
conversation.

D: Communicate with… vendors, landlords,
employees, where you can.
A: What happened in the last few
acquisitions is the owner stayed and the
company continues with the same name and
the same invoices so the customers do not
notice the difference.
C: The first thing we did [after signing LOI]
was we went to [noteholder] and said …we
are going to pay you off, just work with us.
D: Identify the issues, mitigate the risks, that
is how you can get things done.
D: It all gets lost if you don’t capture it [info
about the process] somewhere and have them
coordinate with each other.
A: If they have high [workers comp claims]
the first thing we implement is safety
programs.
B: [Before the closing] we terminated
everybody and hired the people we wanted.
So we got around our management risk with
no obligations for pensions, for whatever.
B: …they went out and put a specific
integration team on that business, so that it
was handled properly.
E: The due diligence team would transition
over, largely, for the relevant people [to
integration].

3.2 Integration
Timing

D: There was no planning done,
caused anxiety

A: We budget every line item…on a monthly
basis.
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3.3 Resources
Shortfall

3.4 Political
Escalation

D: Post-closing you’ve really gone
negative in terms of shareholder
value. The period [immediately after
the close] will determine whether
value increases or decreases.
C: One of the difficulties is that we
weren’t really sure what we bought.
C:[Buyer} said they were going to
integrate the business and they didn’t
have a plan. So without a plan …
they just languished.
E: People struggle with integration
because they don’t plan.
D: Immediately after the
closing…management is exhausted.
A: Our overall [IT] legacy system is
not where it needs to be, one of our
concerns we are trying to address as
we speak.
C: One of the risks was that [the
seller] would come and foreclose us
as we were in breach of material
covenants. We didn’t have any
money.
C:We didn’t have very deep pockets

E: Integration is, quite simply, fanatical
attention to detail.
E: The approach we took was that due
diligence was also integration planning.

BF: Not an alignment of vision
among top management.
BG: The new CEO had enormous
power. He did not understand
manufacturing, he was a retailer, but
owners knew him…
B: So they started force-fitting to
meet expectations.
B: They fired the Chairman and
CFO, and brought in a guy who was
supposed to be a savior and gave him
stupid incentives that insured its
demise.

A: The first thing we will do is… take the HR
department with us.
A: They will be on our HR program the day
after we close.
B: …looking at the organic growth, what was
possible in the business.

D: For the first three months, have a weekly
call, go over the initiatives you have
A: We have a management [integration] team,
myself [CFO], the President of our company,
the sales/general manager of the [home state]
location, IT department.
C: We managed [breach of material
covenants] by maintaining good relationships
with the [seller’s] CFO.
C: They learned, they put the right resources
on it.
E: The due diligence team would transition
over, largely, for the relevant people.
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Appendix D: Examples of Interview Questions
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with five senior managers. The semistructured interview format included the following questions:
1.

Thinking about the mergers you have been involved with, or just the last few if

that is easier, what risks do you believe threatened or could have threatened the success of the
combined companies?
2.

Were there risks which were dealt with so early and quickly that they were not a

problem, but in your experience could have become a threat if ignored?
3.

Thinking of the M&A process itself, were there risks relating to the management

of the process, or the timing of the merger completion or integration? Examples could include
failure to plan for integration, moving process too fast…
4.

Have you had acquisitions which failed, either being abandoned before closing or

closed and then merger did not live up to expectations? If so, why abandoned or what caused the
underperformance?
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Appendix E: Risk Analysis and Risk Prioritization in the Unity Case

In the risk analysis step, management evaluates the risks they have identified and assigns
a rating for the likelihood and impact level for each risk area. We reviewed the Unity case to
apply the risk analysis step of the framework. We reviewed the case and recorded the risks
described by the managers in the case. Based on the reported comments of management about
the risks they faced, we developed an estimate of the risk probability (level) and an estimate of
the loss (impact) on a scale of Low (1 point), Medium (2 points) and High (3 points). We
evaluated the number of mentions of different risks within a risk area, and noted the degree of
impact they described. Where we did not get specific guidance from the managers’ comments,
we made our best estimates of the level and impact of the losses. See Table 15 below for the
values we derived from the managers’ comments.
It appears that if the framework had been used in the Unity case, it might have
contributed to the risk management process. It may have helped management recognize and
prioritize the risks by providing a risk list specific to the transaction. The use of the risk
resolutions in the framework as added input to the risk resolution process may have helped Unity
management in their risk management. For example, a manager on the integration team was
aware that common reasons for disappointing acquisitions include poor organization fit and poor
cultural fit. However, when listing his integration priorities and discussing integration plans, he
prioritized four areas with no further mention of these issues, and it appears they were not
addressed. Use of the framework may have caused his team to evaluate those risks level and
impact of risk specifically for their integration so they could be addressed appropriately in risk
management planning.
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In using the Unity case for an evaluation of the framework, we were limited by the
information available in the case study. The case study was not written for our evaluation, so the
focus and emphasis of the authors may not have made the case ideally suited for our evaluation.
Since the framework was not used during the M&A process, but was applied by us retroactively,
we were not able to evaluate how a management group might actually use the framework to
guide or change their process. And we are not able to look back and see the results of the M&A
process to determine the framework’s usefulness.
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Table 14-1– Risk Analysis of Unity Case

Risk Name

Risk Definition

L M
1.1

Systems
Compatibility

2.1

Customer
Relationships
Resources
Shortfall

3.3

1.2

Integration Bias

3.2

Integration
Timing

2.3

Adverse
Behavior

3.1

Process
Management

3.4

Political
Escalation
Organizational
Culture

1.3

1.4

National Culture

2.2

Contextual
Ignorance

2.4

External
Stakeholder

Merging firms have practices, systems,
reward systems or operating policies which
are so incompatible integration problems
are created.
Customer relationships are negatively
impacted by the merger.
There is insufficient slack, resources or
skills to properly prosecute the integration
program or realize expected benefits of the
merger
Integration decisions are dominated by one
party or by limited business, technical or
functional areas.
Timeliness of the planning for and
implementation of the integration is
inadequate.
Employee behavior due to the merger
process negatively impacts company
performance during and after the merger
process.
Inadequate management action or
leadership of the merger process leads to a
significant departure from merger goals.
Political struggles over which company’s
management systems to use
Merger process or integration is hampered
or resisted due to differences in corporate
cultures.
Merger process or integration is negatively
impacted by differences in nationalities,
language or culture.
Contexts outside the company are not
adequately understood or are insufficiently
attended to during the merger process.
Outside stakeholders do not support,
understand or collaborate with the process.

Impact
of
Risk

Risk
Level

Risk
Exposure

H L M H
x

x

9

x

x

9

x

x

9

x

6

x

x

x

6

x

x

4

x

x

4

x

x

4
0

0

0

0
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